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Abstract
Navigation is one of the most popular cloud computing services. But in virtually all cloud-based
navigation systems, the client must reveal her location and destination to the cloud service provider in
order to learn the fastest route. In this work, we present a cryptographic protocol for navigation on city
streets that provides privacy for both the client’s location and the service provider’s routing data. Our
key ingredient is a novel method for compressing the next-hop routing matrices in networks such as city
street maps. Applying our compression method to the map of Los Angeles, for example, we achieve over
tenfold reduction in the representation size. In conjunction with other cryptographic techniques, this
compressed representation results in an efficient protocol suitable for fully-private real-time navigation
on city streets. We demonstrate the practicality of our protocol by benchmarking it on real street map
data for major cities such as San Francisco and Washington, D.C.
1 Introduction
Location privacy is a major concern among smartphone users, and there have been numerous controversies
due to companies tracking users’ locations [AVD11, Che11]. Among the various applications that require
location information, navigation is one of the most popular. For example, companies such as Google,
Apple, and Waze have built traffic-aware navigation apps to provide users with the most up-to-date routing
information. But to use these services, users must reveal their location and destination to the cloud service
provider. In doing so, they may also reveal other sensitive information about their personal lives, such as
their health condition, their social and political affiliations, and more.
One way to provide location privacy is for the user to download the entire map from the cloud service
provider and then compute the best route locally on her own mobile device. Unfortunately, since service
providers invest significant resources to maintain up-to-date routing information, they are not incentivized
to publish their entire routing database in real-time. Even in the case of a paid premium service, in which
the service provider does not derive compensation from learning the user’s location data, it is not obvious
how to achieve fully-private navigation. The user does not trust the cloud provider with her location data,
and the cloud provider does not trust the user with its up-to-date routing information, so neither party has
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all of the data to perform the computation. While general-purpose cryptographic tools such as multiparty
computation solve this problem in theory (see Section 7), these protocols are prohibitively expensive in
practice for applications such as real-time navigation.
Our results. In this work, we present an efficient cryptographic protocol for fully-private navigation: the
user keeps private her location and destination, and the service provider keeps private its proprietary routing
information (except for the routing information associated with the specific path requested by the user and
a few generic parameters pertaining to the network). We give a complete implementation of our protocol
and benchmark its performance on real street map data (Section 5.3). Since our protocol is real-time (the
user continues receiving directions throughout the route), we benchmark the performance “per hop”, where
each hop roughly corresponds to an intersection between streets.1 For cities such as San Francisco and
Washington, D.C., each hop in our protocol requires about 1.5 seconds and less than 100 KB of bandwidth.
In addition, before the protocol begins, we execute a preprocessing step that requires bandwidth in the
tens of megabytes. Since this preprocessing step can be performed at any time, in practice it would likely
be run via a fast Wi-Fi connection, before the mobile user needs the real-time navigation service, and thus
the additional cost is very modest. To our knowledge, ours is the first fully-private navigation protocol
efficient enough to be feasible in practice.
Our technical contributions. In our work, we model street-map networks as graphs, in which the
nodes correspond to street intersections, and edges correspond to streets. In our model, we assume that
the network topology is public (i.e., in the case of navigation on city streets, the layout of the streets is
publicly known). However, only the service provider knows the up-to-date traffic conditions, and thus the
shortest path information. In this case, the server’s “routing information” consists of the weights (that is,
travel times) on the edges in the network.
By modeling street-maps as graphs, we can easily construct a straw-man private navigation protocol
based on symmetric private information retrieval (SPIR) [GIKM00, KO97, NP05]. Given a graph G with
n nodes, the server first constructs a database with n2 records, each indexed by a source-destination pair
(s, t). The record indexed (s, t) contains the shortest path from s to t. To learn the shortest path from
s to t, the client engages in SPIR with the server for the record indexed (s, t). Security of SPIR implies
that the client just learns the shortest path and the server learns nothing. While this method satisfies the
basic security requirements, its complexity scales quadratically in the number of nodes in the graph. Due
to the computational cost of SPIR, this solution quickly becomes infeasible in the size of the graph.
Instead, we propose a novel method to compress the routing information in street-map networks.
Specifically, given a graph G with n nodes, we define the next-hop routing matrix M ∈ Zn×n for G to
be the matrix where each entry Mst gives the index of the first node on the shortest path from node s
to node t. To apply our compression method, we first preprocess the graph (Section 3) such that each
entry in the next-hop routing matrix M can be specified by two bits: Mst = (M
(ne)
st , M
(nw)
st ) where
M (ne),M (nw) ∈ {−1, 1}n×n. We then compress M (ne) by computing a sign-preserving decomposition: two
matrices A(ne), B(ne) ∈ Zn×d where d  n such that M (ne) = sign(A(ne) · (B(ne))T ). We apply the same
procedure to compress the other component M (nw). The resulting compression is lossless, so there is no
loss in accuracy in the shortest paths after applying our transformation. When applied to the road network
for the city of Los Angeles, we obtain over 10x reduction in the size of the representation. Our compression
method is highly parallelizable and by running our computation on GPUs, we can compress next-hop
matrices with close to 50 million elements (for a 7000-node network) in under ten minutes.
1In a few cases, hops in our construction occur mid-street or in instances such as traffic circles. These are rare enough that
even in large cities such as Los Angeles, the total number of hops along any route is less than 200.
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Moreover, our compression method enables an efficient protocol for a fully-private shortest path com-
putation. In our protocol, the rounds of interaction correspond to the nodes in the shortest path. On each
iteration of the protocol, the client learns the next hop on the shortest path to its requested destination.
Abstractly, if the client is currently at a node s and navigating to a destination t, then after one round of
the protocol execution, the client should learn the next hop given by Mst = (M
(ne)
st , M
(nw)
st ). Each round
of our protocol thus reduces to a two-party computation of the components M
(ne)
st and M
(nw)
st . Given our
compressed representation of the next-hop routing matrices, computing M
(ne)
st reduces to computing the
sign of the inner product between the sth row of A(ne) and the tth row of B(ne), and similarly for M (nw).
In our construction, we give an efficient method for inner product evaluation based on affine encodings,
and use Yao’s garbled circuits [Yao86, BHR12] to evaluate the sign function. An important component of
our protocol design is a novel way of efficiently combining affine encodings and garbled circuits. Together,
these methods enable us to construct an efficient, fully-private navigation protocol.
Other approaches. An alternative method for private navigation is to use generic tools for two-
party computation such as Yao’s garbled circuits [Yao86, BHR12] and Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [GO96,
SvDS+13]. While these approaches are versatile, they are often prohibitively expensive for city-scale net-
works (in the case of Yao circuits), or do not provide strong security guarantees against malicious clients
(in the case of ORAM). For instance, the garbled-circuit approach by Carter et al. [CMTB13, CLT14]
requires several minutes of computation to answer a single shortest path query in a road network with just
100 nodes. Another generic approach combining garbled circuits and ORAM [LWN+15] requires commu-
nication on the order of GB and run-times ranging from tens of minutes to several hours for a single query
on a network with 1024 nodes. Thus, current state-of-the-art tools for general two-party computation do
not give a viable solution for private navigation in city-scale networks. We survey other related methods
in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries and Threat Model
We begin with some notation. For a positive integer n, let [n] denote the set of integers {1, . . . , n}. For
two `-bit strings x, y ∈ {0, 1}`, we write x⊕ y to denote their bitwise XOR. For a prime p, we write Fp to
denote the finite field with p elements, and F∗p to denote its multiplicative group. Let D be a probability
distribution. We write x ← D to denote that x is drawn from D. Similarly, for a finite set S we write
x
r←− S to denote that x is drawn uniformly at random from S. A function f(λ) is negligible in a security
parameter λ if f = o(1/λc) for all c ∈ N.
For two distribution ensembles {D1}λ , {D2}λ, we write {D1}λ
c≈ {D2}λ to denote that {D1}λ and {D2}λ
are computationally indistinguishable (i.e., no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm can distinguish
them, except with probability negligible in λ). We write {D1}λ ≡ {D2}λ to denote that {D1}λ and {D2}λ
are identically distributed for all λ. For a predicate P(x), we write 1{P(x)} to denote the indicator function
for P(x), i.e., 1{P(x)} = 1 if and only if P(x) is true, and otherwise, 1{P(x)} = 0. If G is a directed
graph, we write (u, v) to denote the edge from node u to node v.
A function F : K×X → Y with key-space K, domain X , and range Y is a PRF [GGM86] if no efficient
adversary can distinguish outputs of the PRF (with key k
r←− K, evaluated on inputs chosen adaptively by
the adversary) from the corresponding outputs of a truly random function from X → Y.
Threat model. We give a high-level survey of our desired security properties, and defer the details to
Section 4.2. We operate in the two-party setting where both parties know the network topology as well as
a few generic parameters about the underlying graph structure (described concretely in Section 4.2), but
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only the server knows the weights (the routing information). The client holds a source-destination pair.
At the end of the protocol execution, the client learns the shortest path between its requested source and
destination, while the server learns nothing. The first property we require is privacy for the client’s location.
Because of the sensitivity of location information, we require privacy to hold even against malicious servers,
that is, servers whose behavior can deviate from the protocol specification.
The second requirement is privacy for the server’s routing information, which may contain proprietary
or confidential information. The strongest notion we can impose is that at the end of the protocol execution,
the client does not learn anything more about the graph other than the shortest path between its requested
source and destination and some generic parameters associated with the underlying network. While this
property is not difficult to achieve if the client is semi-honest (that is, the client adheres to the protocol
specification), in practice there is little reason to assume that the client will behave this way. Thus, we
aim to achieve security against malicious clients. In our setting, we will show that a malicious client learns
only the shortest path from its requested source to its requested destination, except for failure events that
occur with probability at most ≈ 2−30. For comparison, 2−30 is the probability that an adversary running
in time ≈ 250 is able to guess an 80-bit secret key.2
To summarize, we desire a protocol that provides privacy against a malicious server and security against
a malicious client. We note that our protocol does not protect against the case of a server corrupting the
map data; in practice, we assume that the map provider is trying to provide a useful service, and thus is
not incentivized to provide misleading or false navigation information.
3 Graph Processing
As described in Section 1, we model street-map networks as directed graphs, where nodes correspond to
intersections, and edges correspond to streets. To enable an efficient protocol for fully-private shortest
path computation, we first develop an efficient method for preprocessing and compressing the routing
information in the network. In this section, we first describe our preprocessing procedure, which consists
of two steps: introducing dummy nodes to constrain the out-degree of the graph, and assigning a cardinal
direction to each edge. Then, we describe our method for compressing the routing information in the
graph; here, we exploit the geometric structure of the graph.
Bounding the out-degree. Let G be the directed graph representing the road network. We assume that
the nodes in G have low out-degree. In a road network (see Figure 1 for an example), the nodes correspond
to street intersections, and thus typically have at most four outgoing edges, one in each cardinal direction.
In the first step of our preprocessing procedure, we take a weighted, directed graph G and transform it
into a weighted, directed graph G′ where each node has maximum out-degree 4. Specifically, we start by
setting G′ = G. Then, as long as there is a node u ∈ G′ with neighbors v1, . . . , v` and ` > 4, we do the
following. First, we add a new node u′ to G′. For i ≥ 4, we add the edge (u′, vi) to G′ and remove the edge
(u, vi) from G′. We also add a zero-weight edge from u to u′ in G′. By construction, this transformation
preserves the shortest-path between nodes in G and constrains the out-degree of all nodes in G′ to 4.
Orienting the edges. In a road network, we can associate each node by an (x, y) pair in the coordinate
plane (for example, the node’s latitude and longitude). Consider a coordinate system aligned with the
cardinal directions: the x-axis corresponds to the east-west axis and the y-axis corresponds to the north-
south axis. Then, for each node u in the graph G, we associate each of its neighbors vi (0 ≤ i < 4) with a
direction diri ∈ {n,e, s,w} (for north, east, south, west, respectively) relative to u. For a concrete example,
2Even in the case of these low-probability failure events, one can show that a malicious client only learns a bounded-length
path emanating from its requested source, though it may not be a shortest path to any particular destination.
4
Figure 1: Subsection of map of Washington, D.C. from OpenStreetMap [Ope] (left) and visualization of the routing
network after preprocessing (right). The visualization on the right shows the first hop of the shortest path from the
source node (denoted by the circle) to all other nodes in the graph (denoted by a polygon). In this example, the
source node has three neighbors: to the north, west, and south (as indicated in the diagram). If the first hop in the
shortest path from the source to a node is to move north, then the node is represented by a green triangle. If the
first hop is to move west, then the node is represented by a blue diamond, and if the first hop is to move south, then
the node is represented by an orange pentagon.
refer to the visualization of the preprocessed graph in Figure 1. Here, the center node (labeled “src”) has
three neighbors, each of which is associated with a cardinal direction: north, west, or south in this case.
We define the orientation of an edge to be the direction associated with the edge.
To determine the orientation of the edges in G, we proceed as follows. For each node u ∈ G, we associate
a unique direction diri ∈ {n,e, s,w} with each neighbor vi of u. In assigning the four cardinal directions to
each node’s neighbors, we would like to approximate the true geographical locations of the nodes. In our
setting, we formulate this assignment as a bipartite matching problem for each node u, with u’s neighbors
(at most 4) forming one partition of the graph, and the four cardinal directions {n,e, s,w} forming the
other. We define the cost of a matching between a neighbor vi of u and a direction dirj to be the angle
formed by the vector from u to vi and the unit vector aligned in the direction dirj . In assigning directions
to neighbors, we desire a matching that minimizes the costs of the matched neighbors. Such a matching
can be computed efficiently using the Hungarian method [KY55]. In this way, we associate a cardinal
direction with each edge in G.
Compressing shortest paths. Next, we describe a method for compressing the next-hop routing matrix
for a road network. Let G be a directed graph with n nodes and maximum out-degree 4. Using the method
described above, we associate a direction dir ∈ {n,e, s,w} with each edge in G. Since there are four possible
values for dir, we can encode the direction using exactly two bits bne and bnw, where bne = 0 if and only
if dir ∈ {n,e}, and bnw = 0 if and only if dir ∈ {n,w}. Intuitively, bne encodes the direction with respect
to the northwest-southeast axis while bnw encodes the direction with respect to the northeast-southwest
axis. Thus, for each node u ∈ G, we associate a unique two-bit index (bne, bnw) with each of its outgoing
edges. For notational convenience, we define a function IndexToDirection that maps an index (bne, bnw) to
the corresponding direction dir ∈ {n,e, s,w}. Specifically,
IndexToDirection(0, 0) = n
IndexToDirection(1, 0) = w
IndexToDirection(0, 1) = e
IndexToDirection(1, 1) = s.
(1)
We next compute the shortest path pst between all source-destination pairs (s, t) in G. In our imple-
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mentation, we run Dijkstra’s algorithm [Dij59] on each node in G, but the precise choice of shortest-path
algorithm does not matter for our compression procedure, as its cost is dominated by the other steps. After
computing all-pairs shortest paths in G, we define the next-hop routing matrices M (ne), M (nw) ∈ {0, 1}n×n
for G, where (M (ne)st , M (nw)st ) encodes the direction of the first edge in the shortest path pst.
Just as the geometry of road networks enables us to orient the edges, the geometry also suggests a
method for compressing the next-hop routing matrices. Take for example the road network in Figure 1.
From the visualization, we observe that when the destination t lies to the north of the source s, the first
hop on the shortest path is usually to take the edge directed north. In our framework, this means that
both M
(ne)
st and M
(nw)
st are more likely to be 0 rather than 1. Thus, by orienting the edges in the graph
consistently, we find that the resulting routing matrices M (ne) and M (nw) have potentially compressible
structure.
To compress a matrix M ∈ {0, 1}n×n, we first rescale the elements in M to be in {−1, 1}. Our goal is
to find two matrices A,B ∈ Zn×d such that sign(ABT ) = M with d < n.3 We can formulate the problem
of computing A and B as an optimization problem with objective function J(A,B):
J(A,B) =
n∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
`
((
ABT
)
jk
, Mjk
)
, (2)
where `(x, t) is a loss function. A simple loss function is the 0-1 loss function `(x, t) = 1{sign(x) 6= t},
which assigns a uniform loss of 1 whenever the sign of the predicted value x does not match the target
value t. However, from an optimization perspective, the 0-1 loss is not a good loss function since it is
non-convex and neither continuous nor differentiable. Practitioners have instead used continuous convex
approximations to the 0-1 loss, such as the SVM hinge loss `hinge(x, t) = max(0, 1− tx) [RVC+04] and its
quadratically smoothed variant, the modified Huber hinge loss [Zha04]:
`huber(x, t) =
{
max(0, 1− tx)2 tx ≥ −1
−4 · tx otherwise. (3)
In our setting, we use the modified Huber hinge loss `huber. While `huber is convex in the input x, it is not
convex in the optimization parameters A,B (due to the matrix product), and so the objective function
J(A,B) is not convex in A,B. Thus, standard optimization algorithms like LBFGS [BLNZ95] are not
guaranteed to find the global optimum. The hope is that even a local optimum will correspond to a
low-rank, sign-preserving decomposition of the matrix M , and indeed, we confirm this empirically.
When we perform the optimization using LBFGS, the matrices A,B are real-valued. To obtain matrices
over the integers, we scale the entries in A,B by a constant factor and round. The scaling factor is
empirically chosen so as to preserve the relation sign(ABT ) = M . We describe this in greater detail in
Section 5.3.
4 Private Navigation Protocol
In this section, we describe our protocol for privately computing shortest paths. First, we describe the
cryptographic building blocks we employ in our construction.
3This is not the same as computing a low-rank approximation of M . Our goal is to find low-rank matrices whose product
preserves the signs of the entries of M . In practice, the matrix M is full-rank, and not well-approximated by a low-rank
product.
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Private information retrieval. A computational private information retrieval (PIR) [CMS99, CGKS95,
KO97, Cha04, GR05, Lip05, OI07] protocol is a two-party protocol between a sender who holds a database
D = {r1, . . . , rn} and a receiver who holds an index i ∈ [n]. At the conclusion of the PIR protocol, the
receiver learns ri while the sender learns nothing. A PIR protocol only ensures privacy for the receiver’s
index (and not for the remaining records in the sender’s database).
Oblivious transfer. Similar to PIR, an 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer (OT) protocol [NP99, NP01, NP05,
Rab05] is a two-party protocol that allows the receiver to privately retrieve a record ri from the sender who
holds a database {r1, . . . , rn}. In contrast with PIR, an OT protocol also provides privacy for the sender:
the receiver only learns its requested record ri, and nothing else about the other records. Closely related
is the notion of symmetric PIR (SPIR) [KO97, GIKM00, NP05], which is functionally equivalent to OT.
Garbled circuits. Yao’s garbled circuits [Yao86, LP09, BHR12] were initially developed for secure two-
party computation. The core of Yao’s construction is an efficient transformation that takes a Boolean
circuit C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m and produces a garbled circuit C˜ along with n pairs of encodings {k0i , k1i }i∈[n].
Then, for any input x ∈ {0, 1}n, the combination of the garbled circuit C˜ and the encodings Sx = {kxii }i∈[n]
(where xi denotes the i
th bit of x) enable one to compute C(x), and yet reveal nothing else about x.
4.1 Protocol Design Overview
We first give an intuitive overview of our fully-private navigation protocol. As described in Section 3, we
first preprocess the network G to have maximum out-degree d = 4 and then associate a cardinal direction
with each of the edges in G. As in Section 3, let (M (ne),M (nw)) be the precomputed next-hop routing
matrices for G, and let (A(ne), B(ne)), (A(nw), B(nw)) be the compressed representation of M (ne),M (nw),
respectively.
Our private shortest paths protocol is an iterative protocol that reveals the shortest path from a source
s to a destination t one hop at a time. When the client engages in the protocol with input (s, t), it learns
which neighbor v of s is the next node on the shortest path from s to t. Then, on the next round of the
protocol, the client issues a query (v, t) to learn the next node in the path, and so on, until it arrives at the
destination node t. With this iterative approach, each round of our protocol can be viewed as a two-party
computation of the entry (M
(ne)
st ,M
(nw)
st ) from the next-hop routing matrices. We give the full description
of our private navigation protocol in Figure 3, and sketch out the important principles here. To simplify
the presentation, we first present the core building blocks that suffice for semi-honest security. We then
describe additional consistency checks that we introduce to obtain security against a malicious client and
privacy against a malicious server.
4.1.1 Semi-honest Secure Construction
Abstractly, we can view each round of our protocol as computing the following two-party functionality
twice (once for M (ne) and once for M (nw)). The server has two matrices A,B ∈ Zn×d, which we will refer
to as the source and destination matrices, respectively, and the client has two indices s, t ∈ [n]. At the
end of the protocol, the client should learn sign(〈As, Bt〉), where As and Bt are the sth and tth rows of A
and B, respectively. The client should learn nothing else about A and B, while the server should not learn
anything. Our protocol can thus be decomposed into two components:
1. Evaluation of the inner product 〈As, Bt〉 between the source vector As and the destination vector Bt.
2. Determining the sign of 〈As, Bt〉.
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In the following, we will work over a finite field Fp large enough to contain the entries in A,B. In particular,
we view A,B as n× d matrices over Fp.
Evaluating the inner product. The first step in our protocol is evaluating the inner product between
the source vector As and the destination vector Bt. Directly revealing the value of 〈As, Bt〉 to the client,
however, leaks information about the entries in the compressed routing matrices A,B. To protect against
this leakage, we instead reveal a blinded version of the inner product. Specifically, on each round of the
protocol, the server chooses blinding factors α
r←− F∗p and β r←− Fp. We then construct the protocol such
that at the end of the first step, the client learns the blinded value α〈As, Bt〉+ β instead of 〈As, Bt〉.
One candidate approach for computing the blinded inner product is to use a garbled circuit. However,
while Yao’s garbled circuits suffice for private evaluation of any two-party functionality, when the underlying
operations are more naturally expressed as addition and multiplication over Fp, it is more convenient to
express the functionality in terms of an arithmetic circuit. In an arithmetic circuit (over Fp), the “gates”
correspond to field operations (addition and multiplication), and the values on the wires correspond to
field elements.
In recent work, Applebaum et al. [AIK14] construct the analog of Yao’s garbling procedure for arith-
metic circuits. In particular, evaluating a function of the form f(x, y) = 〈x, y〉+∑i∈[d] zi, where x, y ∈ Fdp
and each zi ∈ Fp is a constant can be done efficiently using the affinization gadgets from [AIK14, §5].
Specifically, for each xi, yi, we define the following affine encoding functions L
affine
xi (xi), L
affine
yi (yi):
Laffinexi (xi) =
(
xi − r(1)i , xir(2)i + zi + r(3)i
)
Laffineyi (yi) =
(
yi − r(2)i , yir(1)i − r(1)i r(2)i − r(3)i
)
, (4)
where r
(1)
i , r
(2)
i , r
(3)
i are chosen uniformly from Fp. We will also write Laffinexi (xi; ri), L
affine
yi (yi; ri) to denote
affine encodings of xi and yi using randomness ri ∈ F3p. Given Laffinexi (xi) and Laffineyi (yi) for all i ∈ [n],
evaluating f(x, y) corresponds to evaluating the expression∑
i∈[n]
[
Laffinexi (xi)
]
1
·
[
Laffineyi (yi)
]
1
+
[
Laffinexi (xi)
]
2
+
[
Laffineyi (yi)
]
2
, (5)
where we write [·]i to denote the ith component of a tuple. For notational convenience, we also define
Laffinex (x) and L
affine
y (y) as
Laffinex (x) =
(
Laffinex1 (x1), . . . , L
affine
xd
(xd)
)
Laffiney (y) =
(
Laffiney1 (y1), . . . , L
affine
yd
(yd)
)
. (6)
Similarly, we write Laffinex (x; r), L
affine
y (y; r) to denote the affine encoding of vectors x, y ∈ Fdp using ran-
domness r ∈ F3dp . The affine encodings Laffinex (x), Laffiney (y) provides statistical privacy for the input vectors
x, y [AIK14, Lemma 5.1].
Next, we describe how these affine encodings can be used to compute the blinded inner product in the
first step of the protocol. At the beginning of each round, the server chooses blinding factors α
r←− F∗p
and β
r←− Fp. Then, it constructs the affine encoding functions Laffinex , Laffiney for the function fα,β(x, y) =
〈αx, y〉+β according to Eq. (4). Next, the server prepares two encoding databases Dsrc and Ddst where the
sth record in Dsrc consists of the affine encodings Laffinex (As) of each source vector, and the tth record in Ddst
consists of Laffiney (Bt) of each destination vector. To evaluate the blinded inner product, the client performs
two SPIR queries: one for the sth record in Dsrc to obtain the encodings of As and one for the tth record
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in Ddst to obtain the encodings of Bt.4 The client then evaluates the arithmetic circuit using Eq. (5) to
obtain z = fα,β(As, Bt). To a malicious client, without knowledge of α or β, the value fα,β(As, Bt) appears
uniform over Fp and independent of As, Bt.
Determining the sign. To complete the description, it remains to describe a way for the client to learn
the sign of the inner product 〈As, Bt〉. The client has the value z = α〈As, Bt〉+ β from the output of the
arithmetic circuit while the server knows the blinding factors α, β. Since computing the sign function is
equivalent to performing a comparison, arithmetic circuits are unsuitable for the task. Instead, we construct
a separate Yao circuit to unblind the inner product and compare it against zero. More specifically, let
g(x, γ, δ) = 1{[γx+δ]p > 0}, where [·]p denotes reduction modulo p, with output in the interval (−p/2, p/2).
Then,
g(z, α−1,−α−1β) = sign(As, Bt).
To conclude the protocol, the server garbles a Boolean circuit Cunblind for the unblinding function g to
obtain a garbled circuit C˜unblind along with a set of encodings Lunblind. It sends the garbled circuit to the
client, along with encodings of the unblinding coefficients γ = α−1, δ = α−1β to the client. The client
engages in 1-out-of-2 OTs to obtain the input encodings of z, and evaluates the garbled circuit C˜unblind to
learn sign(〈As, Bt〉).
4.1.2 Enforcing Consistency for Stronger Security
As described, the protocol reveals just a single edge in the shortest path. Repeated iteration of the protocol
allows the client to learn the full shortest path. Moreover, since the server’s view of the protocol execution
consists only of its view in the PIR and OT protocols, privacy of these underlying primitives ensures privacy
of the client’s location, even against a malicious server.5
Security for the server only holds if the client follows the protocol and makes consistent queries on each
round. However, a malicious client can request the shortest path for a different source and/or destination
on each round, thereby allowing it to learn edges along arbitrary shortest paths of its choosing. To protect
against a malicious client, we bind the client to making consistent queries across consecutive rounds of the
protocol. We say that a sequence of source-destination queries (s1, t1), . . . , (s`, t`) is consistent if for all
i ∈ [`], t1 = ti, and si+1 = vi where vi is the first node on the shortest path from si to ti.
Consistency for the destinations. To bind the client to a single destination, we do the following. At
the beginning of the protocol, for each row i ∈ [n] in Ddst, the server chooses a symmetric encryption key
kdst,i. Then, on each round of the protocol, it encrypts the i
th record in Ddst with the key kdst,i. Next,
at the beginning of the protocol, the client OTs for the key kdst,t corresponding to its destination t. Since
this step is performed only once at the beginning of the protocol, the only record in Ddst that the client
can decrypt is the one corresponding to its original destination. Because each record in Ddst is encrypted
under a different key, the client can use a PIR protocol instead of an SPIR protocol when requesting the
record from Ddst.
Consistency for the sources. Maintaining consistency between the source queries is more challenging
because the source changes each round. We use the fact that the preprocessed graph has out-degree at
4The databases Dsrc and Ddst are each databases over n records (as opposed to n2 in the straw-man protocol from Section 1).
5While a malicious server can send the client malformed circuits or induce selective failure attacks, the server does not receive
any output during the protocol execution nor does the client abort the protocol when malformed input is received. Thus, we
achieve privacy against a malicious server.
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Inputs: Tuples (zne, γne, δne), (znw, γnw, δnw) ∈ F3p, PRF keys k0ne, k1ne, k0nw, k1nw ∈ {0, 1}ρ, and the source and
destination nodes s, t ∈ [n]. The bit-length τ is public and fixed (hard-wired into g).
Operation of g:
• If s = t, then output ⊥.
• If [γnezne + δne]p /∈ [−2τ , 2τ ] or [γnwznw + δnw]p /∈ [−2τ , 2τ ], output ⊥.
• Let bne = 1{[γnezne + δne]p > 0}, and let bnw = 1{[γnwznw + δnw]p > 0}. Output (bne, bnw, kbnene , kbnwnw ).
Figure 2: Neighbor-computation function g for the private routing protocol.
most four. Thus, on each round, there are at most four possible sources that can appear in a consistent
query in the next round.
Our construction uses a semantically-secure symmetric encryption scheme (Enc,Dec) with key-space
{0, 1}`, and a PRF F with domain {n,e, s,w} and range {0, 1}`. On each round of the protocol, the server
generates a new set of source keys ksrc,1, . . . , ksrc,n ∈ {0, 1}` for encrypting the records in Dsrc in the next
round of the protocol. The server also chooses four PRF keys k0ne, k
1
ne, k
0
nw, k
1
nw, which are used to derive
directional keys kn, ke, ks, kw. Next, for each node v ∈ [n] in Dsrc, let vdir be the neighbor of v in direction
dir ∈ {n,e, s,w} (if there is one). The server augments the vth record in Dsrc with an encryption of the
source key ksrc,vdir under the directional key kdir.
When the client requests record v from Dsrc, it also obtains encryptions of the keys of the neighbors
of v for the next round of the protocol. By ensuring the client only learns one of the directional keys, it
will only be able to learn the encryption key for a single source node on the next round of the protocol.
We achieve this by including the PRF keys k0ne, k
1
ne, k
0
nw, k
1
nw used to derive the directional keys as input
to the garbled circuit. Then, in addition to outputting the direction, the garbled circuit also outputs the
subset of PRF keys needed to derive exactly one of the directional keys kn, ke, ks, kw. This ensures that
the client has at most one source key in the next round of the protocol.
Consistency within a round. In addition to ensuring consistency between consecutive rounds of the
protocol, we also require that the client’s input to the garbled circuit is consistent with the output it
obtained from evaluating the affine encodings. To enforce this, we use the fact that the entries of the
routing matrices A,B are bounded: there exists τ such that 〈As, Bt〉 ∈ [−2τ , 2τ ] for all s, t ∈ V . Then, in
our construction, we choose the size of the finite field Fp to be much larger than the size of the interval
[−2τ , 2τ ]. Recall that the arithmetic circuit computes a blinded inner product z ← α〈As, Bt〉 + β where
α, β are uniform in F∗p and Fp, respectively. To unblind the inner product, the server constructs a garbled
circuit that first evaluates the function gγ,δ(z) = γz+δ with γ = α
−1 and δ = −α−1β. By construction, γ is
uniform over F∗p and δ is uniform over Fp. Thus, using the fact that
{
gγ,δ(z) | γ ∈ F∗p, δ ∈ Fp
}
is a pairwise
independent family of functions, we conclude that the probability that gγ,δ(z
′) ∈ [−2τ , 2τ ] is precisely
2τ+1/p for all z′ ∈ Fp. By choosing p 2τ+1, we can ensure that the adversary cannot successfully cheat
except with very small probability.
Lastly, we remark that when the client issues a query (s, t) where s = t, the protocol should not
reveal the key for any other node in the graph. To address this, we also introduce an equality test into
the garbled circuit such that on input s = t, the output is ⊥. We give a complete specification of the
neighbor-computation function that incorporates these additional consistency checks in Figure 2.
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Fix a security parameter λ and a statistical security parameter µ. Let G = (V,E) be a weighted directed graph
with n vertices, such that the out-degree of every vertex is at most 4. The client’s input to the protocol consists
of two nodes, s, t ∈ V , representing the source and destination of the shortest path the client is requesting. The
server’s inputs are the compressed routing matrices A(ne), B(ne), A(nw), B(nw) ∈ Zn×d (as defined in Section 3).
We assume the following quantities are public and known to both the client and the server:
• The structure of the graph G, but not the edge weights.
• The number of columns d in the compressed routing matrices.
• A bound on the bit-length τ of the values in the products A(ne) · (B(ne))T and A(nw) · (B(nw))T .
• The total number of rounds R.
In the following description, let (Enc,Dec) be a CPA-secure symmetric encryption scheme with key space
{0, 1}`, and let F : {0, 1}ρ × {n,e, s,w} → {0, 1}` be a PRF (where `, ρ = poly(λ)). Fix a prime-order finite
field Fp such that p > 2τ+µ+1.
Setup:
1. For each i ∈ [n], the server chooses independent symmetric encryption keys k(1)src,i, kdst,i r←− {0, 1}`.
2. The client and the server engage in two 1-out-of-n OT protocols with the client playing the role of the
receiver:
• The client requests the sth record from the server’s database (k(1)src,1, . . . , k(1)src,n), receiving a value kˆ(1)src .
• The client requests the tth record from the server’s database (kdst,1, . . . , kdst,n), receiving a value
kˆdst.
For each round r = 1, . . . , R of the protocol:
1. The server chooses blinding factors αne, αnw
r←− F∗p and βne, βnw r←− Fp. Next, let γne = α−1ne and δne =
−α−1ne βne ∈ Fp. Define γnw and δnw analogously.
2. Let fne, fnw : Fdp×Fdp → Fp where fne(x, y) = 〈αnex, y〉+ βne and fnw(x, y) = 〈αnwx, y〉+ βnw. The server
then does the following:
• Apply the affine encoding algorithm (Eq. 4) to fne to obtain encoding functions Laffinene,x , Laffinenw,y , for
the inputs x and y, respectively.
• Apply the affine encoding algorithm to fnw to obtain encoding functions Laffinenw,x , Laffinenw,y .
3. Let Cunblind be a Boolean circuit for computing the neighbor-computation function in Figure 2. The
server runs Yao’s garbling algorithm on Cunblind to obtain a garbled circuit C˜unblind along with encoding
functions Lunblindx , for each of the inputs x to the neighbor-computation function in Figure 2.
4. The server chooses symmetric encryption keys k
(r+1)
src,1 , . . . , k
(r+1)
src,n
r←− {0, 1}`. These are used to encrypt the
contents of the source database on the next round of the protocol.
5. The server chooses four PRF keys k0ne, k
1
ne, k
0
nw, k
1
nw
r←− {0, 1}ρ, two for each axis. Then, the server defines
the encryption keys for each direction as follows:6
kn = F (k
0
ne,n)⊕ F (k0nw,n)
ks = F (k
1
ne, s)⊕ F (k1nw, s)
ke = F (k
0
ne,e)⊕ F (k1nw,e)
kw = F (k
1
ne,w)⊕ F (k0nw,w).
Figure 3: The fully-private routing protocol, as outlined in Section 4. The protocol description continues on the next
page.
6An alternative approach is for the server to choose the encryption keys kn, ke, ks, kw uniformly at random from {0, 1}`
instead of using the key-derivation procedure. In this case, the neighbor-computation function (Figure 2) would be
modified to take as input the encryption keys kn, ke, ks, kw rather than the PRF keys k
0
ne, k
1
ne, k
0
nw, k
1
nw, and would output
a single encryption key. While this approach is conceptually simpler, the resulting neighbor-computation circuits are
slightly larger. In our implementation, we use the key-derivation procedure shown in the figure.
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6. The server prepares the source database Dsrc as follows. For each node u ∈ [n], the uth record in Dsrc is
an encryption under k
(r)
src,u of the following:
• The arithmetic circuit encodings Laffinene,x (A(ne)u ), Laffinenw,x (A(nw)u ) of the source vectors A(ne)u and A(nw)u .
• The garbled circuit encodings Lunblinds (u) of the source node u.
• Encryptions of the source keys for the neighbors of u in the next round of the protocol under the
direction keys:
κn = Enc(kn, k
(r+1)
src,vn ), κe = Enc(ke, k
(r+1)
src,ve ), κs = Enc(ks, k
(r+1)
src,vs ), κw = Enc(kw, k
(r+1)
src,vw),
where vn, ve, vs, vw is the neighbor of u to the north, east, south, or west, respectively. If u does not
have a neighbor in a given direction dir ∈ {n,e, s,w}, then define k(r+1)src,vdir to be the all-zeroes string
0`.
7. The server prepares the destination database Ddst as follows. For each node u ∈ [n], the uth record in
Ddst is an encryption under kdst,u of the following:
• The arithmetic circuit encodings Laffinene,y (B(ne)u ), Laffinenw,y (B(nw)u ) of the destination vectors B(ne)u and
B
(nw)
u .
• The garbled circuit encodings Lunblindt (u) of the destination node u.
8. The client and server engage in two PIR protocols with the client playing role of receiver:
• The client requests record s from the server’s database Dsrc and obtains a record cˆsrc.
• The client requests record t from the server’s database Ddst and obtains a record cˆdst.
9. The client decrypts the records: rˆsrc ← Dec(kˆ(r)src , cˆsrc) and rˆdst ← Dec(kˆdst, cˆdst):
• It parses rˆsrc into two sets of arithmetic circuit encodings Lˆaffinene,x and Lˆaffinenw,x , a set of garbled circuit
encodings Lˆunblinds , and four encryptions κˆn, κˆe, κˆs, κˆw of source keys for the next round.
• It parses rˆdst into two sets of arithmetic circuit encodings for Lˆaffinene,y and Lˆaffinenw,y , and a set of garbled
circuit encodings Lˆunblindt .
Using the encodings Lˆaffinene,x and Lˆ
affine
ne,y , the client evaluates the arithmetic circuit (Eq. 5) to learn zˆne.
Similarly, using the encodings Lˆaffinenw,x and Lˆ
affine
nw,y , the server evaluates to learn zˆnw. If the parsing of rˆsrc
or rˆdst fails or the arithmetic circuit encodings are malformed, the client sets zˆne, zˆnw
r←− Fp.
10. The client engages in a series of 1-out-of-2 OTs with the server to obtain the garbled circuit encodings
Lunblindzne (zˆne) and L
unblind
znw (zˆnw) of zˆne and zˆnw, respectively. Let Lˆ
unblind
zne and Lˆ
unblind
znw denote the encodings
the client receives.
11. The server sends to the client the garbled circuit C˜unblind and encodings of the unblinding coefficients
Lunblindγne (γne), L
unblind
γnw (γnw), L
unblind
δne (δne), L
unblind
δnw (δnw),
as well as encodings of the PRF keys
Lunblindk0ne (k
0
ne), L
unblind
k1ne
(k1ne), L
unblind
k0nw
(k0nw), L
unblind
k1nw
(k1nw).
Figure 3 (Continued): The fully-private routing protocol, as outlined in Section 4. The protocol description continues
on the next page.
12
12. The client evaluates the garbled circuit C˜unblind. If the garbled circuit evaluation is successful and the client
obtain outputs (bˆne, bˆnw, kˆne, kˆnw), then the client computes a direction dir = IndexToDirection(bˆne, bˆnw) ∈
{n,e, s,w} (Eq. (1)).
(a) The client computes the direction key kˆdir = F (kˆne, dir)⊕ F (kˆnw, dir). Next, the client decrypts the
encrypted source key κˆdir to obtain the source key kˆ
(r+1)
src = Dec(kˆdir, κˆdir) for the next round of the
protocol.
(b) Let vdir be the neighbor of s in the direction given by dir (define vdir to be ⊥ if s does not have a
neighbor in the direction dir). If vdir 6= ⊥, the client outputs vdir and updates s = vdir. Otherwise, if
vdir = ⊥, the client outputs ⊥ and leaves s unchanged.
If the OT for the input wires to the garbled circuit fails, the garbled circuit evaluation fails, or the output of
the garbled circuit is ⊥, then the client outputs ⊥, but continues with the protocol: it leaves s unchanged
and sets kˆ
(r+1)
src
r←− {0, 1}`.
Figure 3 (Continued): The fully-private routing protocol, as outlined in Section 4.
4.2 Security Model
In this section, we formally specify our security model. To define and argue the security of our protocol, we
compare the protocol execution in the real-world (where the parties interact according to the specification
given in Figure 3) to an execution in an ideal world where the parties have access to a trusted party
that computes the shortest path. Following the conventions in [Can06], we view the protocol execution
as occurring in the presence of an adversary A and coordinated by an environment E = {E}λ (modeled
as a family of polynomial size circuits parameterized by a security parameter λ). The environment E is
responsible for choosing the inputs to the protocol execution and plays the role of distinguisher between
the real and ideal experiments.
As specified in Figure 3, we assume that the following quantities are public to the protocol execution:
the topology of the network G = (V,E), the number of columns d in the compressed routing matrices, a
bound on the bit-length τ of the values in the matrix products A(ne) · (B(ne))T and A(nw) · (B(nw))T , and
the total number of rounds R (i.e., the number of hops in the longest possible shortest path). We now
define the real and ideal models of execution.
Definition 4.1 (Real Model of Execution). Let pi be a private navigation protocol. In the real world,
the parties interact according to the protocol specification pi. Let E be the environment and let A be an
adversary that corrupts either the client or the server. The protocol execution in the real world proceeds
as follows:
1. Inputs: The environment E chooses a source-destination pair s, t ∈ V for the client and compressed
next-hop routing matrices A(ne), B(ne), A(nw), B(nw) ∈ Zn×d for the server. The bit-length of all
entries in the matrix products A(ne) · (B(ne))T and A(nw) · (B(nw))T must be at most τ . Finally, the
environment gives the input of the corrupted party to the adversary.
2. Protocol Execution: The parties begin executing the protocol. All honest parties behave according
to the protocol specification. The adversary A has full control over the behavior of the corrupted
party and sees all messages received by the corrupted party.
3. Output: The honest party computes and gives its output to the environment E . The adversary
computes a function of its view of the protocol execution and gives it to E .
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At the conclusion of the protocol execution, the environment E outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Let REALpi,A,E(λ)
be the random variable corresponding to the value of this bit.
Definition 4.2 (Ideal Model of Execution). In the ideal world, the client and server have access to a
trusted party T that computes the shortest paths functionality f .
1. Inputs: Same as in the real model of execution.
2. Submission to Trusted Party: If a party is honest, it gives its input to the trusted party. If a
party is corrupt, then it can send any input of its choosing to T , as directed by the adversary A.
3. Trusted Computation: From the next-hop routing matrices, the trusted party computes the first
R hops on the shortest path from s to t: s = v0, v1, . . . , vR. If vi = t for some i < R, then the trusted
party sets vi+1, . . . , vR to ⊥. If the next hop in the path at vi for some i refers to a node not in G,
then the trusted party sets vi+1, . . . , vR to ⊥. The trusted party sends the path v0, . . . , vR to the
client. The server receives no output.
4. Output: An honest party gives the sequence of messages (possibly empty) it received from T to E .
The adversary computes a function of its view of the protocol execution and gives it to E .
At the conclusion of the protocol execution, the environment E outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Let IDEALf,A,E(λ)
be the random variable corresponding to the value of this bit.
To state our security theorems, we now define the environment’s distinguishing advantage. Informally,
we will say that a protocol is secure if no polynomial-size environment is able to distinguish the real
execution from the ideal execution with non-negligible probability.
Definition 4.3 (Distinguishing Advantage — Security). Let pi be a private navigation protocol, and let
f be the shortest path functionality. Fix an adversary A, simulator S, and an environment E . Then, the
distinguishing advantage Adv
(sec)
pi,f,A,S,E of E in the security game is given by
Adv
(sec)
pi,f,A,S,E(λ) = |Pr[REALpi,A,E(λ) = 0]− Pr[IDEALf,A,E(λ) = 0]| .
We will also work with a weaker notion of privacy against a malicious adversary. Informally, we say
that the protocol is private if an adversary is unable to learn anything about the inputs of the other party
beyond what is explicitly leaked by the inputs and outputs of the computation. To formalize this notion,
we use the conventions in [IKK+11] and define the distinguishing advantage in the privacy game.
Definition 4.4 (Distinguishing Advantage — Privacy). Let pi be a private navigation protocol, and let
f be the shortest path functionality. Fix an adversary A, simulator S, and an environment E . Define
REAL′pi,A,E(λ) exactly as REALpi,A,E(λ) (Definition 4.1), except in the final step of the protocol execution, the
environment only receives the adversary’s output (and not the honest party’s output). Define IDEAL′f,S,E(λ)
analogously. Then, the distinguishing advantage Adv
(priv)
pi,f,A,S,E of E in the privacy game is given by
Adv
(priv)
pi,f,A,S,E(λ) =
∣∣Pr[REAL′pi,A,E(λ) = 0]− Pr[IDEAL′f,A,E(λ) = 0]∣∣ .
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4.3 Security Theorems
The first requirement is that our protocol provides security against a malicious client. This captures the
notion that a malicious client does not learn anything more about the server’s routing information beyond
the shortest path between its requested endpoints and the publicly available information. In our setting,
we allow a privacy-performance trade-off where the client has a small probability (R · 2−µ, where µ is
the statistical security parameter) of learning additional information about the routing information. Since
the order p of the finite field must satisfy p > 2τ+µ+1, using larger finite fields will decrease the failure
probability, but at the expense of performance. In our experiments, R · 2−µ ≈ 2−30. We now state the
formal security guarantee, but defer its formal proof to Appendix A.2.
Theorem 4.5 (Security Against a Malicious Client). Let pi be the protocol in Figure 3 instantiated with a
CPA-secure encryption scheme (Enc,Dec), a secure PRF F , and an OT scheme secure against a malicious
client. Let λ, µ be the security parameter and statistical security parameter, respectively. Let f be the ideal
shortest-paths functionality. Then, for all PPT adversaries A, there exists a PPT adversary S such that
for every polynomial-size circuit family E = {E}λ,
Adv
(sec)
pi,f,A,S,E(λ) ≤ negl(λ) +R · 2−µ,
where negl(λ) denotes a negligible function in λ.
In addition to security against a malicious client, we require our protocol to provide privacy against a
malicious server. In other words, while a malicious server might be able to cause the client to receive an
invalid path, it still cannot learn any information about the client’s source or destination. We formalize
this in the following theorem. We defer the formal proof to Appendix A.1.
Theorem 4.6 (Privacy Against a Malicious Server). Let pi be the protocol in Figure 3 instantiated with
PIR and OT primitives that provide privacy against a malicious server. Let λ be a security parameter
and let f be the ideal shortest-paths functionality. Then, for all PPT adversaries A, there exists a PPT
adversary S such that for every polynomial-size circuit family E = {E}λ,
Adv
(priv)
pi,f,A,S,E(λ) ≤ negl(λ),
where negl(λ) denotes a negligible function in λ.
5 Experiments
In this section, we describe our implementation of the private routing protocol from Figure 3. Then,
we describe our procedure for preprocessing and compressing actual road networks for major cities taken
from OpenStreetMap [Ope]. Finally, we give concrete performance benchmarks for our preprocessing and
compression pipeline as well as our private routing protocol on actual road networks.
5.1 Protocol Implementation
To evaluate the performance of the protocol in Figure 3, we implemented the complete protocol in C++.
In this section, we describe the building blocks of our implementation. For each primitive, we choose the
parameters to guarantee a minimum of 80 bits of security. The complete protocol implementation contains
approximately 4000 lines of code.
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PIR. We implemented the (recursive) PIR protocol based on additive homomorphic encryption from [KO97,
OI07]. We instantiate the additive homomorphic encryption scheme with Paillier’s cryptosystem [Pai99],
and use NTL [Sho] over GMP [Gt12] to implement the necessary modular arithmetic. We use a 1024-bit
RSA modulus for the plaintext space in the Paillier cryptosystem, which provides 80 bits of security. We
use two levels of recursion in the PIR protocol, so the communication scales as O( 3
√
n) for an n-record
database.
OT. We instantiate the OT protocol with the protocol from [HL10, §7.3] which provides security against
malicious clients and privacy against malicious servers. This protocol is a direct generalization of the Naor-
Pinkas OT protocol [NP01] based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. Security against a
malicious client is enforced by having the client include a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (specifically, a
Schnorr proof [Sch89]) with its OT request. To decrease the number of rounds of communication, we apply
the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86] to transform the interactive proof of knowledge into a non-interactive
one by working in the random oracle model. We instantiate the random oracle with the hash function
SHA-256. For improved performance, we implement the Naor-Pinkas OT protocol over the 256-bit elliptic
curve group numsp256d1 from [BCLN14]. We use the MSR-ECC [BCLN14] library for the implementation
of the underlying elliptic curve operations. The 256-bit curve provides 128 bits of security.
Arithmetic and Yao’s circuits. We implement our arithmetic circuits over the finite field Fp where
p = 261 − 1 is a Mersenne prime. Then, reductions modulo p can be performed using just two p-bit
additions. We use NTL [Sho] over GMP [Gt12] for the finite field arithmetic.
For the garbled circuit implementation, we use JustGarble [BHKR13] with the “free XOR” [KS08]
and row-reduction optimizations [PSSW09]. We set the parameters of the garbling framework to obtain
80-bits of security. We use the optimized addition, comparison, and multiplexer circuits from [KSS09] to
implement the neighbor-computation function shown in Figure 2. For multiplication, we implement the
basic “school method.”
Record encryption and PRF. We instantiate the CPA-secure encryption scheme in Figure 3 with AES
in counter mode. We also instantiate the PRF used for deriving the neighbor keys (Step 5 in Figure 3)
with AES. We use the implementation of AES from OpenSSL [The03].
5.2 Preprocessing and Map Compression.
We extract the street maps for four major cities (San Francisco, Washington, D.C., Dallas, and Los Angeles)
from OpenStreetMap [Ope]. For each city, we take its most important roadways based on annotations in
OpenStreetMap, and construct the resulting graph G. Specifically, we introduce a node for each street
intersection in the city and an edge for each roadway. We assign edge weights based on the estimated
time needed to traverse the associated road segment (computed by taking the length of the segment and
dividing by the approximated speed limit along the segment). Using the procedure described in Section 3,
we preprocess the graph to have out-degree at most 4. We then associate each edge of G with a cardinal
direction by solving the assignment problem from Section 3. We use Stachniss’ implementation [Sta04] of
the Hungarian method [KY55] to solve this assignment problem.
Given the graph G corresponding to the road network for each city, we run Dijkstra’s algorithm [Dij59]
on each node s in G to compute the shortest path between all pairs of nodes. Then, using the all-pairs
shortest paths information, we construct the next-hop routing matrices (M (ne),M (nw)) for G. We remark
that we can substitute any all-pairs shortest path algorithm for Dijkstra’s in this step. The underlying
principle we exploit in the construction of our protocol is the fact that next-hop routing matrices for road
networks have a simple compressible structure amenable to cryptography.
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City n Preprocessing Time (s) Compression Time (s)
San Francisco 1830 0.625 97.500
Washington, D.C. 2490 1.138 142.431
Dallas 4993 4.419 278.296
Los Angeles 7010 9.188 503.007
Table 1: Average time to preprocess and compress the next-hop routing matrices for different networks. The second
column gives the number of nodes n in each city’s road network. The preprocessing time column gives the average
time needed to orient the edges, compute all-pairs shortest paths, and construct the next-hop routing matrix for the
network. The compression time column gives the average time needed to compress the ne or nw component of the
next-hop routing matrices.
Finally, we implement the optimization-based compression approach described in Section 3 to compress
the next-hop routing matrices M (ne) and M (nw). We minimize the objective function from Eq. (2) with
the loss function set to the modified Huber hinge loss from Eq. (3). Because of the highly parallelizable
nature of the objective function, we write specialized CUDA kernels to evaluate the objective function
and its derivative on the GPU. In our experiments, we use the LBFGS optimization algorithm [BLNZ95]
from the Python scientific computation libraries NumPy and SciPy [ADH+01] to solve the optimization
problem.
5.3 Experiments
Graph preprocessing and compression. We first measure the time needed to preprocess and compress
the next-hop routing matrices for several road networks. The preprocessing time includes the time needed
to orient the edges, compute all-pairs shortest paths, and construct the next-hop routing matrix for the
network (as described in Section 5.2).
We also measure the time needed to compress the resulting next-hop routing matrices for the different
networks. Recall that our compression method takes a matrix M ∈ {−1, 1}n×n and produces two matrices
A,B ∈ Zn×d such that sign(ABT ) is a good approximation of M . Since the modified Huber hinge loss
(Eq. 3) is an upper bound on the 0-1 loss function `(x, t) = 1 {sign(x) = t}, when the objective value
J(A,B) is less than 1 (where J(A,B) is the objective function in Eq. 2), we have sign(ABT ) = M , i.e., the
matrices A,B perfectly reconstruct M . The parameter d is the number of columns in the matrices A and
B. Because our objective function is non-convex in the variables A and B, LBFGS is neither guaranteed
to find the globally optimal solution, nor even to converge in a reasonable number of iterations. As a
heuristic for deciding whether a candidate value of d admits a feasible solution that perfectly reconstructs
M (ne) and M (nw), we run up to 5000 iterations of LBFGS and check whether the resulting solution gives
a perfect reconstruction of M . To determine the most compact representation, we search over a range of
possible values for d, and choose the smallest value d that yields a perfect reconstruction of M .
We apply our compression method to the routing matrices for road networks from four cities of varying
size. Then, we compare the size of the original matrix M to the size of its compressed representation A,B.
The number of bits needed to represent A,B is determined by two factors: the number of columns d in
each matrix A,B and the precision ν (measured in number of bits) needed to represent each entry in A,B.
Recall that the optimization procedure outputs two real-valued matrices such that sign(ABT ) = M . To
obtain a representation over the integers (as required by the arithmetic circuits), we scale the entries of
A,B by a constant factor and round each of the resulting entries to the nearest integer. The precision ν
is the number of bits needed to represent each integer component of A,B after rescaling. We choose the
smallest scaling factor such that the rescaled matrices perfectly reconstruct the routing matrix M .
We run the preprocessing and compression experiments on a machine running Ubuntu 14.04 with
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City n d ν τ Compression Factor
San Francisco 1830 12 10 20 7.63
Washington, D.C. 2490 14 10 19 8.89
Dallas 4993 19 12 23 10.95
Los Angeles 7010 26 12 24 11.23
Table 2: Parameters for the compressed representation of the road networks for each city: n is the number of nodes
in each network, d and ν are the number of columns and the precision, respectively, in the routing matrices A(ne),
B(ne), A(nw), B(nw) of the compressed representation, and τ is the maximum number of bits needed to represent an
element in the products A(ne)(B(ne))T and A(nw)(B(nw))T . The last column gives the compression factor attained
for each network (ratio of size of uncompressed representation to size of compressed representation).
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Figure 4: Average time needed to compress the next-hop routing matrix and the resulting compression factor for
networks constructed from subgraphs of the road network of Los Angeles.
an 8-core 2.3 GHz Intel Core i7 CPU, 16 GB of RAM, and an Nvidia GeForce GT 750M GPU. The
preprocessing and compression times for the different networks are summarized in Table 1. A description
of the compressed representation of the routing matrices for each network is given in Table 2.
In Figure 4, we show the time needed to compress a single component of the next-hop routing matrix,
as well as the resulting compression factor, for subgraphs of the road network for Los Angeles. The
compression is quite effective, and the achievable compression factor increases with the size of the network.
Moreover, even though the sizes of the next-hop routing matrices increase quadratically in the number
of nodes in the graph, the optimization time remains modest. For graphs with 7000 nodes (and 350,000
optimization variables), finding a compact representation that perfectly reconstructs the next-hop matrix
completes in under 10 minutes. Since we compress both the ne and nw components of the routing matrix,
the total time to both preprocess and compress the shortest path information for the full city of Los Angeles
is just over 15 minutes. Lastly, we note that the preprocessing time for each network is small: orienting
the edges and computing all-pairs shortest paths via Dijkstra’s algorithm completes in under 10 seconds.
Performance on road networks. Next, we measure the run-time and bandwidth requirements of our
private routing protocol from Figure 3. Table 2 gives the number of columns d, and the precision ν of
the compressed representation of the networks for the different cities. In addition, we also compute the
maximum number of bits τ needed to encode an element in the products A(ne)(B(ne))T and A(nw)(B(nw))T .
From Theorem 4.5, a malicious client can successfully cheat with probability at most R ·2−µ, where µ is the
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City
Total Time (s) Client Computation (s) Server Computation (s) Bandwidth (KB)
(Single Round) Total PIR OT GC Total PIR OT Upload Download
San Francisco 1.44± 0.16 0.35 0.31 0.02 0.02 0.88 0.80 0.08 51.74 36.50
Washington, D.C. 1.64± 0.13 0.38 0.34 0.02 0.02 1.07 1.00 0.08 52.49 37.51
Dallas 2.91± 0.19 0.45 0.41 0.02 0.02 2.19 2.11 0.08 55.50 39.52
Los Angeles 4.75± 0.22 0.55 0.51 0.02 0.02 3.70 3.62 0.08 57.01 43.53
Table 3: Performance benchmarks (averaged over at least 90 iterations) for a single round of the private routing
protocol described in Figure 3 on road networks for different cities. The “Total Time” column gives the average
runtime and standard deviation for a single round of the protocol (including network communication times between
a client and a server on Amazon EC2). The PIR, OT, and GC columns in the table refer to the time to perform
the PIR for the affine encodings, the time to perform the OT for the garbled circuit encodings, and the time needed
to evaluate the garbled circuit, respectively. The bandwidth measurements are taken with respect to the client
(“upload” refers to communication from the client to the server)
City R
Offline Setup Online Setup Total Online Total Online
Time (s) Band. (MB) Time (s) Band. (MB) Time (s) Bandwidth (MB)
San Francisco 97 0.135 49.08 0.73 0.021 140.39 8.38
Washington, D.C. 120 0.170 60.72 0.76 0.023 197.48 10.57
Dallas 126 0.174 63.76 0.92 0.027 371.44 11.72
Los Angeles 165 0.223 83.49 1.00 0.028 784.34 16.23
Table 4: End-to-end performance benchmarks for the private routing protocol in Figure 3 on road networks for
different cities. For each network, the number of iterations R is set to the maximum length of the shortest path
between two nodes in the network. The offline computation refers to the server preparation and garbling of the R
circuits for evaluating the neighbor-computation function from Figure 2. The offline computation time just includes
the computational cost and does not include the garbled circuit download time. The online setup measurements
correspond to computation and communication in the “Setup” phase of the protocol in Figure 3. The “Total Online
Time” and “Total Online Bandwidth” columns give the total end-to-end time (including network communication)
and total communication between the client and server in the online phase (navigation component) of the protocol.
statistical security parameter, and R is the total number of rounds in the protocol. For each network in our
experiments, we set the number of rounds R to be the maximum length over all shortest paths between any
source-destination pair in the network. This ensures both correctness (at the end of the protocol execution,
the client obtains the complete shortest path from its source to its destination) as well as hides the length
of the requested shortest path from the server (since the number of rounds in the protocol is independent
of the client’s input). Next, recall the relation between µ and the order p of the finite field for the affine
encodings: p > 2τ+µ+1. In our experiments, we fix p = 261 − 1, and R is at most 28 = 256. This choice
of parameters translates to µ ranging from 36 to 41, or analogously, a failure probability of 2−33 for the
smaller networks to 2−28 for larger networks. Using larger fields will reduce this probability, but at the
expense of performance.
To reduce the communication in each round of the protocol in Figure 3, we note that it is not necessary
for the server to prepare and send a garbled circuit to the client on each round of the routing protocol. Since
the neighbor-computation circuit is independent of the state of the protocol execution, the circuits can be
generated and stored long before the protocol execution begins. Thus, in an offline phase, the server can
prepare and transmit to the client a large number of garbled circuits. During the online protocol execution,
on the rth round, the server just sends the encodings corresponding to its input to the client; it does not
send the description of the garbled circuit. This significantly reduces the communication cost of each round
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of the online protocol. We note that even if the routing matrices A(ne), B(ne), A(nw), B(nw) changed (for
instance, due to updates in traffic or weather conditions in the network) during the protocol execution, as
long as the bound τ on the bit-length of entries in the products A(ne)(B(ne))T and A(nw)(B(nw))T remain
fixed, the client and server do not have to redo this offline setup phase. We describe our extension for
supporting live updates to the routing information in greater detail in Section 6.
We run the server on a compute-optimized Amazon EC2 instance (running Ubuntu 14.04 with a 32-
core 2.7 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2680v2 processor and 60 GB of RAM) to model the computing resources of
a cloud-based map provider. The throughput of our protocol is bounded by the PIR computation on the
server’s side. We use up to 60 threads on the server for the PIR computation. All other parts of our system
are single-threaded. For the client, we use a laptop running Ubuntu 14.04 with a 2.3 GHz Intel Core i7
CPU and 16 GB of RAM. The connection speed on the client is around 50 Mbps. Both client and server
support the AES-NI instruction set, which we leverage in our implementation.
First, we measure the cost of one round of the private navigation protocol. We assume that the client
has already downloaded the garbled circuits prior to the start of the protocol. Table 3 gives the total
computation time and bandwidth per round of the routing protocol. When measuring the total time, we
measure the end-to-end time on the client, which includes the time for the network round trips. Table 3 also
gives a breakdown of the computation in terms of each component of the protocol: PIR for the arithmetic
circuit encodings, OT for the garbled circuit encodings, and garbled-circuit evaluation for computing the
next-hop.
We also measure the total end-to-end costs for a single shortest path query. As noted earlier, we set
the number of rounds R for each network to be the maximum length of any shortest path in the network.
Irrespective of the client’s source or destination, the client and server always engage in exactly R rounds
of the private navigation protocol. Table 4 shows the total computation time and bandwidth required to
complete a shortest-path query in the different networks. In the end-to-end benchmarks, we also measure
the offline costs of the protocol, that is, the time needed for the server to garble R neighbor-computation
circuits and the amount of communication needed for the client to download the circuits. In addition,
we measure the computation and bandwidth needed in the online setup phase of the routing protocol
(Figure 3).
In our protocol, the online setup phase of the protocol consists of three rounds of interaction. First, the
server sends the client the public description of the map. Then the client OTs for the source and destination
keys for the first round of the protocol, which requires two rounds of communication. As shown in Table 4,
the online setup procedure completes in at most a second and requires under 30 KB of communication in
our example networks.
Next, we consider the performance of each round of the protocol. From Table 3, the most compu-
tationally intensive component of our protocol is computing the responses to the PIR queries. In our
implementation, we use a Paillier-based PIR, so the server must perform O(n) modular exponentiations
on each round of the protocol. While it is possible to use a less computationally-intensive PIR such
as [MBFK14], the bandwidth required is much higher in practice. Nonetheless, our results demonstrate
that the performance of our protocol is within the realm of practicality for real-time navigation in cities
like San Francisco or Washington, D.C.
Lastly, we note that the offline costs are dominated essentially by communication. With hardware
support for AES, garbling 100 neighbor-computation circuits on the server completes in just a quarter of a
second. While garbling is fast, the size of each garbled circuit is 518.2 KB. For city networks, we typically
require 100-150 circuits for each shortest-path query; this corresponds to 50-100 MB of offline download
prior to the start of the navigation protocol. The experimental results, however, indicate that the number
of garbled circuits required for an end-to-end execution grows sublinearly in the size of the graph. For
example, the total number of rounds (and correspondingly, the number of required garbled circuits) for a
graph with 1800 nodes is just under 100, while for a graph with almost four times more nodes, the number
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of rounds only increases by a factor of 1.7. We also note that each neighbor-computation circuit consists
of just under 50,000 non-XOR gates. In contrast, generic protocols for private navigation that construct a
garbled circuit for Dijkstra’s algorithm yield circuits that contain hundreds of millions to tens of billions
of non-XOR gates [CMTB13, CLT14, LWN+15].
Finally, we see that despite needing to pad the number of rounds to a worst-case setting, the total cost
of the protocol remains modest. For the city of Los Angeles, which contains over 7000 nodes, a shortest-
path query still completes in under 15 minutes and requires just over 16 MB of total bandwidth. Moreover,
since the path is revealed edge-by-edge rather than only at the end of the computation, the overall protocol
is an efficient solution for fully-private navigation.
Comparison to other approaches for private navigation. Many protocols [DK05, LLLZ09, XSS14]
have been proposed for private navigation, but most of them rely on heuristics and do not provide strong
security guarantees [DK05, LLLZ09], or guarantee privacy only for the client’s location, and not the server’s
routing information [XSS14]. A different approach to fully-private navigation is to leverage generic mul-
tiparty computation techniques [Yao86, GMW87]. For instance, a generic protocol for private navigation
is to construct a garbled circuit for a shortest-path algorithm and apply Yao’s protocol. This approach
is quite expensive since the entire graph structure must be embedded in the circuit. For instance, Liu
et al. [LWN+15] demonstrate that a garbled circuit for evaluating Dijkstra’s algorithm on a graph with
just 1024 nodes requires over 10 billion AND gates. The bandwidth needed to transmit a circuit of this
magnitude quickly grows to the order of GB. In contrast, even for a larger graph with 1800 nodes, the total
online and offline communication required by our protocol is under 60 MB (and the online communication
is under 10 MB). Carter et al. [CMTB13, CLT14] describe methods for reducing the computational and
communicational cost of Yao’s protocol by introducing a third (non-colluding) party that facilitates the
computation. Even with this improvement, evaluating a single shortest path on a graph of 100 nodes still
requires over 10 minutes of computation. As a point of comparison, our protocols complete in around 2-3
minutes for graphs that are 15-20 times larger. Evidently, while the generic tools are powerful, they do not
currently yield a practical private navigation protocol. We survey additional related work and techniques
in Section 7.
6 Extensions
In this section, we describe several extensions to our protocol: supporting navigation between cities,
handling updates to the routing information, and updating the source node during the protocol execution
(for instance, to accommodate detours and wrong turns).
Navigating between cities. The most direct method for supporting navigation across a multi-city
region is to construct a network that spans the entire region and run the protocol directly. However, since
the server’s computation in the PIR protocols grows as O(nd log p), where n is the number of nodes in the
graph, d is the number of columns in the compressed representation, and p is the order of the finite field
used for the affine encodings, this can quickly become computationally infeasible for the server.
An alternative method that provides a performance-privacy trade-off is to introduce a series of publicly-
known waypoints for each city. For example, suppose a user is navigating from somewhere in Los Angeles
to somewhere in San Diego. In this case, the user would first make a private routing request to learn
the fastest route from her current location to a waypoint in Los Angeles. Once the user arrives at the
waypoint in Los Angeles, she requests the fastest route to a waypoint in San Diego. This second query is
performed entirely in the clear, so the user reveals to the server that she is traveling from Los Angeles to
San Diego. Once the user arrives at a waypoint in San Diego, she makes a final private routing request
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to learn the fastest route to her destination. In this solution, the server only obtains a macro-view of the
user’s location: it learns only the user’s source and destination cities, and no information about the user’s
particular location within the city. As we have demonstrated, the protocol in Figure 3 is able to handle
real-time navigation for a single city; thus, using this method of waypoints, we can also apply our protocol
to navigation between cities with limited privacy loss.
Live updates to routing information. Routing information in road networks is dynamic, and is influ-
enced by current traffic conditions, weather conditions, and other external factors. Ideally, the edges
revealed in an iterative shortest-path protocol should always correspond to the shortest path to the
destination given the current network conditions. It is fairly straightforward to allow for updates to
the routing information in our protocol. Specifically, we observe that the compressed routing matrices
A(ne), A(nw), B(ne), B(nw) need not be fixed for the duration of the protocol. As long as the total number
of columns d, the bound on the bit-length τ of the values in the matrix products A(ne) · (B(ne))T and
A(nw) · (B(nw))T , and the total number of rounds R in the protocol remain fixed, the server can use a dif-
ferent set of routing matrices on each round of the protocol. Therefore, we can accommodate live updates
to the routing information during the protocol execution by simply setting a conservative upper bound
on the parameters d, τ, R. Note that we can always pad a routing matrix with fewer than d columns to
one with exactly d columns by adding columns where all entries are 0. Since computing the shortest path
information for a city-wide network and compressing the resulting routing matrices completes in just a few
minutes, it is possible to ensure accurate and up-to-date routing information in practice.
Updating sources and destinations. Typically, in navigation, the user might take a detour or a wrong
turn. While the protocol is designed to constrain the client to learn a single contiguous route through the
network, it is possible to provide a functionality-privacy trade-off to accommodate deviations from the
actual shortest path. One method is to introduce an additional parameter K, such that after every K
iterations of the protocol, the server chooses fresh source keys for the next round of the protocol. After
every K rounds, the client would also OT for a new source key. Effectively, we are resetting the protocol
every K rounds and allowing the client to choose a new source from which to navigate. Correspondingly,
we would need to increase the total number of rounds R in order to support the potential for detours
and wrong turns. Though we cannot directly bound the number of rounds R, we can use a conservative
estimate. Of course, a dishonest client can now learn multiple sub-paths to its chosen destination, namely,
one sub-path each time it is allowed to choose a different source. In a similar manner, we can support
updates to the destination.
7 Related Work
Numerous approaches have been proposed for private shortest path computation [DK05, LLLZ09, MY12,
Mou13, XSS14, CMTB13, CLT14, BSA13, WNL+14, KS14, LWN+15]. Early works such as [DK05,
LLLZ09] propose hiding the client’s location by either providing approximate locations to the server [DK05]
or by having the client submit dummy sources and destinations with each shortest path query [LLLZ09].
However, these approaches only provide limited privacy for the client’s location. Later works [Mou13,
MY12, XSS14] describe PIR-based solutions for hiding the client’s location. In [Mou13, MY12], the client
first privately retrieves subregions of the graph that are relevant to its query [Mou13, MY12] and then
locally computes the shortest path over the subgraph. In [XSS14], the client privately requests for columns
of the next-hop routing matrix to learn the next hop in the shortest path. While these methods provide
privacy for the client’s location, they do not hide the server’s routing information.
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There is also work on developing secure protocols for other graph-theoretic problems and under different
models [BS05, FG06]. For example, Brickell and Shmatikov [BS05] consider a model where two parties
hold a graph over a common set of vertices, and the goal is to compute a function over their joint graphs.
Their protocols do not extend to navigation protocols where one party holds the full graph, and only the
client should learn the result of the computation. In [FG06], the authors describe protocols for parties
who each hold a subset of a graph to privately reconstruct the joint graph. Their methods are designed
for social network analysis and do not directly apply to private navigation.
Another line of work has focused on developing data-oblivious algorithms for shortest path computa-
tion [BSA13] or combining shortest path algorithms such as Dijkstra’s with oblivious data structures or
ORAM [WNL+14, KS14]. In these methods, the routing data is stored in an ORAM or an oblivious data
structure on the server. The client then executes the shortest-path algorithm on the server to learn the
path between its source and destination. Since the pattern of memory accesses is hidden from the server,
these approaches provide client privacy. While these protocols can be efficient in practice, they do not
provide security against a malicious client trying to learn additional details about the routing informa-
tion on the server. Thus, for scenarios where the map data is proprietary (for instance, in the case of
real-time traffic routing), or when the routing information itself is sensitive (for instance, when provid-
ing navigational assistance for a presidential motorcade or coordinating troop movements in a military
scenario [CMTB13, CLT14]), the ORAM-based solutions do not provide sufficient security.
Also relevant are the works in secure multiparty computation (MPC) [Yao86, GMW87]. While these
methods can be successfully used to build private navigation protocols [LWN+15, CMTB13, CLT14], they
do not currently yield a practical private navigation protocol. A more comprehensive comparison of our
protocol to these generic methods is provided at the end of Section 5.3.
There is also a vast literature on graph compression algorithms. For planar graphs, there are multiple
methods based on computing graph separators [LT79, BBK03, BBK04]. Other methods based on coding
schemes [HKL00] have also been proposed and shown to achieve information-theoretically optimal encoding.
While these algorithms are often viable in practice, it is not straightforward to represent them compactly as
a Boolean or an arithmetic circuit. Thus, it is unclear how to combine them with standard cryptographic
primitives to construct a private shortest path protocol.
Finally, there has also been work on developing compact representations of graphs for answering ap-
proximate distance queries in graphs [TZ01]. These techniques have been successfully applied for privacy-
preserving approximate distance computation on graphs [MKNK15]. However, these distance-oracle-based
methods only provide an estimate on the length of the shortest path, and do not give a private navigation
protocol.
8 Conclusion
In this work, we constructed an efficient protocol for privately computing shortest paths for navigation.
First, we developed a method for compressing the next-hop matrices for road networks by formulating the
compression problem as that of finding a sign-preserving, low-rank matrix decomposition. Not only did
this method yield a significant compression, it also enabled an efficient cryptographic protocol for fully
private shortest-path computation in road networks. By combining affine encodings with Yao’s circuits,
we obtained a fully-private navigation protocol efficient enough to run at a city-scale.
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A Security Proofs
In this section, we show that the protocol in Figure 3 securely computes the shortest paths functionality
in the presence of a malicious client, and provides privacy against a malicious server. To simplify our
proofs, we work in the OT-hybrid model where we assume the parties have access to an ideal 1-out-of-n
OT functionality [Kil88]. Specifically, in the real protocol, we replace every OT invocation with an oracle
call to a trusted party that implements the OT functionality: the sender sends the database of records
(r1, . . . , rn) to the trusted party and the receiver sends an index i ∈ [n] to the trusted party. The trusted
party then gives the receiver the record ri. Security in the standard model then follows by instantiating
the ideal OT functionality with an OT protocol that provides security against malicious clients [HL10] and
privacy against malicious servers, and then invoking the sequential composition theorem of [Can00].
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4.6
At a high level, privacy for the client’s location follows from the fact that the server’s view in the protocol
execution consists only of its view in the OT and PIR protocols. By assumption, both the OT protocols and
the PIR protocols provide privacy for the client’s input, so the claim follows. We now show this formally.
As noted at the beginning of Appendix A, we work in the OT-hybrid model, where we replace each OT
invocation with an oracle call to an ideal OT functionality. First, we state the definition of privacy as it
applies to the PIR protocol.
Definition A.1 (Privacy for PIR). Fix a security parameter λ ∈ N, and let pi be a PIR protocol. Let
A be a non-uniform PPT server for pi. Let viewpi,A(1λ,D, i) denote the view of adversary A in the PIR
protocol on database D ∈ {0, 1}∗ (the server’s input) and index i ∈ {0, 1}∗ (the client’s input). Then, pi is
a private PIR protocol if for all non-uniform PPT servers A, databases D ∈ {0, 1}∗, indices i, i′ ∈ {0, 1}∗
where |i| = |i′|, we have that
viewpi,A(1λ,D, i) c≈ viewpi,A(1λ,D, i′).
Let A be a malicious server for the private shortest paths protocol in Figure 3. We construct an
ideal-world simulator S such that the distribution of outputs of A in the real protocol is computationally
indistinguishable from the outputs of S in the ideal world. This suffices to prove that the protocol in
Figure 3 provides privacy against a malicious server. The simulator S begins by running A. Below, we
describe how S simulates the view for A in the protocol execution.
Setup. In the setup phase of the protocol, the simulator does nothing. This is the correct behavior
because in the OT-hybrid model, the adversary A does not receive any messages during the setup phase.
Round. On each round of the protocol, the simulator S plays the role of the client in the PIR protocol
and requests for record 0 in both the source database and in the destination database. Again, since we are
working in the OT-hybrid model, these are the only messages adversary A obtains in the real protocol.
At the end of the protocol execution, adversary A will output some function of its view of the protocol
execution. The simulator S echoes this output to the environment.
Correctness of the simulation. To conclude the proof, it suffices to show that the view S simulates for
A is computationally indistinguishable from the view A expects in the real protocol. This condition holds
vacuously in the setup phase of the protocol. Let view
(r)
A be the adversary’s view on the r
th round of the
protocol. The view view
(r)
A may be written as view
(r)
A =
{
view
(r)
PIR,A(1
λ,Dsrc, isrc), view(r)PIR,A(1λ,Ddst, idst)
}
,
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where Dsrc,Ddst are the encoding databases A chooses in the real protocol, and isrc, idst are the indices of
the records the client chooses in the real protocol. By privacy of the PIR (Definition A.1), it follows that
view
(r)
PIR,A(1
λ,Dsrc, isrc) c≈ view(r)PIR,A(1λ,Dsrc, 0)
view
(r)
PIR,A(1
λ,Ddst, idst) c≈ view(r)PIR,A(1λ,Ddst, 0).
Since the request for the source encodings and for the destination encodings constitute two independent
instances of the PIR protocol, we conclude that the view S simulates for A in each round of the protocol
is computationally indistinguishable from the view A expects in the real protocol. Thus, the output of S
in the ideal-world execution is computationally indistinguishable from that of A in the real world.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4.5
Before we prove Theorem 4.5, we describe the simulatability requirement we require on the garbled circuit
encodings used in the protocol in Figure 3. Intuitively, we require that the garbled circuit encodings can
be entirely simulated given the output of the computation; that is, the garbled circuit together with one
set of encodings do not reveal any information about the underlying inputs other than what is explicitly
revealed by the output. Bellare et al. formalize this notion in [BHR12]. Here, we give a simplified definition
adapted from [GKP+13] and specialized to the case of Yao’s garbling scheme [Yao86, LP09].
Definition A.2 (Yao Garbling Scheme). A Yao garbling scheme ΠYao for a family of circuits {Cn}n∈N
(where Cn is a set of Boolean circuits on n input bits) consists of three algorithms (Yao.Garble,Yao.Encode,
Yao.Eval) where
• Yao.Garble(1λ, C) is a randomized algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ and a circuit
C ∈ Cn for some n and outputs a garbled circuit C˜ along with a secret key sk where sk =
{
L0i , L
1
i
}
i∈[n]
is a set containing n pairs of encodings L0i , L
1
i ∈ {0, 1}∗.
• Yao.Encode(sk, x) is a deterministic algorithm that takes the secret key sk = {L0i , L1i}i∈[n] and an
input x = x1 · · ·xn ∈ {0, 1}n, and outputs an encoding x˜ = {Lxii }i∈[n]. Specifically, the encoding x˜
of x is the subset of encodings in sk associated with the bits of x.
• Yao.Eval(C˜, x˜) is a deterministic algorithm that takes a garbled circuit C˜ and a set of encodings
x˜ = {Lxii }i∈[n] for some x ∈ {0, 1}n and outputs a value z.
Definition A.3 (Correctness). A Yao garbling scheme ΠYao = (Yao.Garble,Yao.Encode,Yao.Eval) for a
family of circuits {Cn}n∈N is correct if for all n = poly(λ), C ∈ Cn, and x ∈ {0, 1}n, the following holds.
Letting (C˜, sk)← Yao.Garble(1λ, C), then with overwhelming probability in λ, we have
Yao.Eval(C˜,Yao.Encode(sk, x)) = C(x),
where the probability is taken over the random coins used in Yao.Garble.
Definition A.4 (Input Privacy). A Yao garbling scheme ΠYao = (Yao.Garble,Yao.Encode,Yao.Eval) for a
family of circuits {Cn}n∈N is input-private if there exists a PPT simulator SYao such that for all n = poly(λ),
C ∈ Cn, x ∈ {0, 1}n, the following holds:{
(C˜, sk)← Yao.Garble(1λ, C) ; (C˜,Yao.Encode(sk, x))
}
c≈ SYao(1λ, C, C(x)).
Lemma A.5 ([Yao86, LP09]). Assuming one-way functions exist, there exists a Yao garbling scheme
(Definition A.2) that is input-private (Definition A.4).
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Next, we note that the affine encodings from Section 4, Eq. (4) provide statistical privacy.
Lemma A.6 ([AIK14, Lemma 5.1], adapted). Fix a finite field Fp of prime order p, and take z1, . . . , zd ∈
Fp. Define the function f : Fdp × Fdp → Fp where f(x, y) = 〈x, y〉 +
∑
i∈[d] zi. Let L
affine
x and L
affine
y be the
affine encoding functions from Eq. (6). Then, there exists a PPT simulator Sac such that for all x, y ∈ Fdp
and z1, . . . , zd ∈ Fp,
Sac(f(x, y)) ≡
{
r
r←− F3dp ;
(
Laffinex (x; r), L
affine
y (y; r)
)}
.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. To show Theorem 4.5, we first define the following hybrid experiments:
• Hybrid Hyb0: This is the real experiment (Definition 4.1).
• Hybrid Hyb1: Same as Hyb0, except the protocol execution aborts if the client succeeds in making
an “inconsistent” query (described below).
• Hybrid Hyb2: This is the ideal experiment (Definition 4.2).
Informally speaking, we say that the client succeeds in making an “inconsistent” query if on some round r,
it requests the garbled circuit encodings for values zˆne and zˆnw that were not the outputs of the arithmetic
circuit, and yet, the client obtains a set of garbled circuit encodings where the garbled circuit evaluation
does not output ⊥. We now specify this property more precisely.
Specification of Hybrid Hyb1. Let s, t ∈ [n] be the source and destination nodes the client sends to
the ideal OT functionality in the setup phase of the protocol in Figure 3. Let (s = v0, v1, . . . , vR) be
the shortest path from s to t as defined by the environment’s choice of the next-hop routing matrices
A(ne), B(ne), A(nw), B(nw) in the protocol execution (Definition 4.1). The protocol execution in Hyb1 pro-
ceeds identically to that in Hyb0, except the protocol execution halts (with output ⊥) if the following bad
event occurs:
On a round 1 ≤ r ≤ R, the client submits zˆne, zˆnw to the ideal OT functionality where either
zˆne 6= αne〈A(ne)vr , B(ne)t 〉+ βne or zˆnw 6= αnw〈A(nw)vr , B(nw)t 〉+ βnw,
and Cunblind((zˆne, γne, δne), (zˆnw, γnw, δnw), k
0
ne, k
1
ne, k
0
nw, k
1
ne, vr, t) 6= ⊥, where all values other than
zˆne, zˆnw, vr, and t are the round-specific values chosen by the server on round r.
Figure 5: Abort event in hybrid Hyb1.
Fix a security parameter λ. Let pi be a private navigation protocol and let f be the ideal shortest-path
functionality. For a client A, a simulator S and an environment E , we define the following random variables:
• Hyb0(λ, pi,A, E) is the output of experiment Hyb0 with adversary A and environment E . In particular,
Hyb0(λ, pi,A, E) = REALpi,A,E(λ) (Definition 4.1).
• Hyb1(λ, pi,A, E) is the output of experiment Hyb1 with adversary A and environment E .
• Hyb2(λ, f,S, E) is the output of experiment Hyb2 with simulator S and environment E . In particular,
Hyb2(λ, f,S, E) = IDEALf,S,E(λ) (Definition 4.2).
To prove Theorem 4.5, we show the following two claims.
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Claim A.7. Let λ, µ be the security parameter and statistical security parameter, respectively. Let pi be the
protocol in Figure 3 instantiated with secure cryptographic primitives as described in Theorem 4.5. Then,
for all PPT adversaries A, and every polynomial-size circuit family E = {E}λ,
|Pr [Hyb0(λ, pi,A, E) = 0]− Pr [Hyb1(λ, pi,A, E) = 0]| ≤ negl(λ) +R · 2−µ.
Claim A.8. Let λ, µ be the security parameter and statistical security parameter, respectively. Let pi be
the protocol in Figure 3 instantiated with secure cryptographic primitives as described in Theorem 4.5. Let
f be the ideal shortest-paths functionality. Then, for all PPT adversaries A, there exists a PPT adversary
S such that for every polynomial-size circuit family E = {E}λ,
|Pr [Hyb1(λ, pi,A, E) = 0]− Pr [Hyb2(λ, f,S, E) = 0]| ≤ negl(λ).
Proof of Claim A.8. We begin by showing Claim A.8. Given a real-world adversary A, we construct an
efficient ideal-world simulator S such that the distribution of outputs of any (possibly malicious) client A
in Hyb1 is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of outputs of an ideal-world simulator
S in Hyb2. Since the server does not produce any output, this will suffice to show that hybrids Hyb1 and
Hyb2 are computationally indistinguishable.
As stated in Section 4.2 and Figure 3, we assume that the topology of the graph G = (V,E), the
number of columns d in the compressed routing matrices, the bound τ on the bit-length of the products of
the compressed matrices, and the total number of rounds R are public and known to both parties in the
protocol execution. Moreover, as described in Figure 3, we assume that p > 2τ+µ+1 where µ ∈ N is the
statistical security parameter. In particular, there exists an element ξ ∈ Fp such that ξ 6∈ [−2τ , 2τ ].
Specification of the simulator. We begin by describing the simulator. We let T denote the trusted
party for the shortest path functionality as defined in the specification of the ideal model of execution from
Section 4.2. The simulator starts running adversary A. We describe the behavior of the simulator in the
setup phase of the protocol as well as the behavior on each round of the routing protocol.
Setup. In the setup phase of the protocol, the simulator S does the following:
1. As in the real protocol, the simulator first chooses independent symmetric encryption keys k¯
(1)
src,i, k¯dst,i
r←−
{0, 1}` for all i ∈ [n].
2. When A makes an OT request for an entry s in the source key database, the simulator replies with
the key k¯
(1)
src,s. Recall that in the ideal OT functionality, each party just sends its input to the ideal
functionality, and the ideal functionality sends the requested element to the client.
3. When A makes an OT request for an entry t in the destination key database, the simulator replies
with the key k¯dst,t to A.
4. Finally, the simulator sends (s, t) to the trusted party T . The trusted party replies to the simulator
with a path (s = v0, . . . , vR).
Round. Next, we describe the behavior of the simulator in each round 1 ≤ r ≤ R of the protocol.
1. The simulator chooses z¯ne, z¯nw
r←− Fp. Then, S invokes the simulator Sac (Lemma A.6) on inputs z¯ne
and z¯nw to obtain four sets of encodings L¯
affine
ne,x , L¯
affine
ne,y , L¯
affine
nw,x , L¯
affine
nw,y .
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2. Let Cunblind be a circuit computing the neighbor-computation function in Figure 2. As in the real
protocol, the simulator runs Yao’s garbling algorithm on Cunblind to obtain a garbled circuit C¯unblind,
along with encoding functions L¯unblindx for each of the inputs x to the neighbor-computation function
in Figure 2.
3. As in the real protocol, the simulator chooses symmetric encryption keys k¯
(r+1)
src,i
r←− {0, 1}` for all
i ∈ [n]. These will be used to encrypt the elements in the source database on the next round of the
protocol.
4. The simulator also chooses four PRF keys k¯0ne, k¯
1
ne, k¯
0
nw, k¯
1
nw
r←− {0, 1}ρ, two for each axis ne,nw. As
in the real scheme, the simulator defines the encryption keys for each direction as follows:
k¯n = F (k¯
0
ne,n)⊕ F (k¯0nw,n)
k¯s = F (k¯
1
ne, s)⊕ F (k¯1nw, s)
k¯e = F (k¯
0
ne,e)⊕ F (k¯1nw,e)
k¯w = F (k¯
1
ne,w)⊕ F (k¯0nw,w).
5. The simulator prepares the source database Dsrc as follows. Let u = vr−1. If u 6= ⊥, then the uth
record in Dsrc is an encryption under k¯(r)src,u of the following:
• Arithmetic encodings L¯affines = (L¯affinene,x , L¯affinenw,x ).
• Garbled circuit encodings L¯unblinds (u).
• Encryptions of the source keys for the neighbors of u in the next round of the protocol under
the direction keys:
Enc(k¯n, k¯
(r+1)
src,vn ), Enc(k¯e, k¯
(r+1)
src,ve ), Enc(k¯s, k¯
(r+1)
src,vs ), Enc(k¯w, k¯
(r+1)
src,vw),
where vn, ve, vw, vw is the neighbor of u in G to the north, east, south, or west, respectively. If
u does not have a neighbor in a given direction j ∈ {n,e, s,w}, then define k¯(r+1)src,vj to be the
all-zeroes string in {0, 1}`.
For all nodes u 6= vr−1, the simulator sets the uth record in Dsrc to be an encryption of the all-zeroes
string under k¯
(r+1)
src,u .
6. The simulator prepares the destination database Ddst as follows. The tth record in Ddst is an encryp-
tion under k¯dst,t of the following:
• Arithmetic encodings L¯affinet = (L¯affinene,y , L¯affinenw,y ).
• Garbled circuit encodings L¯unblindt (t).
For all nodes u 6= t, the simulator sets the uth record in Ddst to be an encryption of the all-zeroes
string under k¯dst,u.
7. When A makes a PIR request for a record in the source database, the simulator plays the role of the
sender in the PIR protocol using Dsrc as its input database.
8. When A makes a PIR request for a record in the destination database, the simulator plays the role
of the sender in the PIR protocol using Ddst as its input database.
9. When A engages in OT for the garbled circuit encodings of zˆne and zˆnw, the simulator replies with
the encodings L¯unblindzne (zˆne) and L¯
unblind
znw (zˆnw).
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10. Let dir ∈ {n,e, s,w} be the direction of the edge from vr−1 to vr in G. The simulator sets γne = 0 =
γnw and δne, δnw as follows:
• If zˆne = z¯ne and zˆnw = z¯nw and vr 6= ⊥, then the simulator sets
δ¯ne =
{
−1 if dir = n or dir = e
1 if dir = s or dir = w
and δ¯nw =
{
−1 if dir = n or dir = w
1 if dir = s or dir = e.
• If zˆne = z¯ne and zˆnw = z¯nw and vr = ⊥, then the simulator sets δ¯ne = ξ = δ¯nw. Recall that
ξ ∈ Fp satisfies ξ /∈ [−2τ , 2τ ].
• If exactly one of zˆne 6= z¯ne or zˆnw 6= z¯nw holds, then with probability ε = 2τ+1/p, the simulator
aborts the simulation and outputs ⊥. Otherwise, with probability 1 − ε, the simulator sets
δ¯ne = ξ = δ¯nw.
• If both zˆne 6= z¯ne and zˆnw 6= z¯nw, then with probability ε2, the simulator aborts and outputs ⊥.
Otherwise, with probability 1− ε2, the simulator sets δ¯ne = ξ = δ¯nw.
The simulator sends to A the garbled circuit C¯unblind, the encodings of the unblinding coefficients
L¯unblindγne (γ¯ne), L¯
unblind
γnw (γ¯nw), L¯
unblind
δne (δ¯ne), L¯
unblind
δnw (δ¯nw),
as well as encodings of the PRF keys
L¯unblindk0ne
(k¯0ne), L¯
unblind
k1ne
(k¯1ne), L¯
unblind
k0nw
(k¯0nw), L¯
unblind
k1nw
(k¯1nw).
At the end of the protocol execution, the adversary A outputs some function of its view of the execution.
If the simulator has not aborted, the simulator gives the output of A to the environment. This completes
the specification of the simulator S. We now show that S correctly simulates the view of A in Hyb1.
Correctness of the simulation. First, we define some random variables for the view of the client in
the real protocol and in the simulation. Let view
(0)
real be the adversary’s view during the setup phase when
interacting according to the real protocol in Hyb1, and let view
(0)
S be the view that S simulates for A during
the setup phase in the ideal world. In this case, view
(0)
real = (kˆ
(1)
src , kˆdst) where s and t correspond to the source
and destination A provided as input to the OT protocol. In the simulated view, view(0)S = (k¯(1)src,s, k¯dst,t)
with s, t defined similarly.
Next, let view
(r)
real be the random variable corresponding to the adversary’s view during round r of the real
protocol, and let view
(r)
S be the view that S simulates for A during round r in the ideal world. More explic-
itly, we write view
(r)
real = (PIRsrc,PIRdst, C˜
unblind, L˜unblind), where PIRsrc and PIRdst denote the client’s view in
the PIR protocol on databases Dsrc and Ddst, respectively, C˜unblind denotes the garbled circuit, and L˜unblind
denotes the set of garbled circuit encodings the client receives via the OT protocol (corresponding to inputs
zˆne and zˆnw) as well as the encodings of the server’s inputs: the unblinding coefficients γne, γnw, δne, δnw,
and the PRF keys k0ne, k
0
ne, k
0
nw, k
1
nw. Similarly, we define view
(r)
S = (PIRsrc,PIRdst, C¯
unblind, L¯unblind), where
PIRsrc and PIRdst denote the client’s view in the PIR protocol over databases Dsrc and Ddst, respectively,
and L¯unblind denotes the set of garbled circuit encodings the client receives from the OT protocol as well
as the encodings of the server’s inputs γ¯ne, γ¯nw, δ¯ne, δ¯nw, k¯
0
ne, k¯
1
ne, k¯
0
nw, k¯
1
nw. Next, define
view
(0:r)
real =
{
view
(i)
real
}r
i=0
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to be the joint distribution of the view of adversary A in the setup and first r rounds of the protocol. We
define view
(0:r)
S analogously. We now show that
view
(0:R)
real
c≈ view(0:R)S .
We first characterize the keys in the simulation. Conceptually, we show that if a client knows at most
one source key in round r, then this property also holds in r + 1. This effectively binds the client to a
single consistent path in the course of the protocol execution.
Lemma A.9. Let s, t ∈ [n] be the source and destination nodes the client submits to the OT oracle in
the setup phase of the simulation. Let (s = v0, . . . , vR) be the path the simulator receives from the trusted
party. Fix a round 0 < r < R, and suppose the following conditions hold:
• For all nodes v 6= vr−1, the conditional distribution of k¯(r)src,v given view(0:r−1)S is computationally
indistinguishable from the uniform distribution on {0, 1}`.
• For all nodes v 6= t, the conditional distribution of k¯dst,v given view(0:r−1)S is computationally indis-
tinguishable from the uniform distribution on {0, 1}`.
Then the corresponding conditions hold for round r + 1.
Proof. We first describe the client’s view of the protocol execution on the rth round of the protocol. For
notational convenience, we set u = vr−1. We now consider each component in view
(r)
S separately:
• The client’s view of the PIR protocol on the source database. We can express the view PIRsrc as
a (possibly randomized) function f1(view
(0:r−1)
S ,Dsrc) in the client’s view of the protocol execution
thus far and the server’s database Dsrc. Each record v 6= u in Dsrc is an encryption of the all-zeroes
string. As long as u 6= ⊥, the uth record in Dsrc contains the following:
– Arithmetic circuit encodings L¯affines = (L¯
affine
ne,x , L¯
affine
nw,x ) of the source node u.
– Garbled circuit encodings L¯unblinds of the node u.
– Encryptions κ¯n, κ¯e, κ¯e, κ¯w of the source keys for the neighbors of u = vr−1 in the next round of
the protocol under the direction keys k¯n, k¯e, k¯s, k¯w:
κ¯n = Enc(k¯n, k¯
(r+1)
src,vn ), κ¯e = Enc(k¯e, k¯
(r+1)
src,ve ), κ¯s = Enc(k¯s, k¯
(r+1)
src,vs ), κ¯w = Enc(k¯w, k¯
(r+1)
src,vw),
where vn, ve, vs, vw is the neighbor of u in G to the north, east, south, or west, respectively. If
u does not have a neighbor in a given direction dir ∈ {n,e, s,w}, then k¯(r+1)src,vdir = {0, 1}`.
• The client’s view of the PIR protocol on the destination database. Similar to the previous case,
we can express the view PIRdst as a (possibly randomized) function f2(view
(0:r−1)
S ,PIRsrc,Ddst). In
hybrid H2, every record v 6= t is an encryption of the all-zeroes string. The tth record consists of the
following:
– Arithmetic circuit encodings L¯affinet = (L¯
affine
ne,y , L¯
affine
nw,y ) of the destination node t.
– Garbled circuit encodings L¯unblindt of the destination node t.
• The garbled circuit C¯unblind.
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• The set of garbled circuit encodings from the OT protocol. In the OT hybrid model, each OT is
replaced by an oracle call to the ideal OT functionality. Thus, L¯unblind consists of a set of garbled
circuit encodings L¯unblindzne , L¯
unblind
znw from the OT protocol, encodings L¯
unblind
γne , L¯
unblind
γnw , L¯
unblind
δne
, L¯unblindδnw
of the server’s unblinding coefficients and encodings L¯unblind
k0ne
, L¯unblind
k1ne
, L¯unblind
k0nw
, L¯unblind
k1nw
of the server’s
PRF keys.
We can express the adversary’s view as
view
(r)
S =
{
f¯
(
view
(0:r−1)
S , κ¯n, κ¯e, κ¯s, κ¯w, affine, L¯
unblind
s , L¯
unblind
t
)
, C¯unblind, L¯unblind
}
, (7)
where f¯ is a (possibly randomized) function, and affine = (L¯affines , L¯
affine
t ) are the affine encodings of the
source and destination vectors.
By construction, the set of encodings
{
L¯unblinds , L¯
unblind
t , L¯
unblind
}
constitute a complete set of encodings
for a single unique input x¯ to the neighbor-computation function, and so invoking Lemma A.5, we conclude
that there exists a PPT algorithm S¯1 such that
view
(r)
S
c≈ S¯1
(
1λ, view
(0:r−1)
S , κ¯n, κ¯e, κ¯s, κ¯w, affine, C
unblind, Cunblind(x¯).
)
.
To conclude the proof, we condition on the possible outputs of Cunblind(x¯). There are two cases:
• Suppose Cunblind(x¯) = (bˆne, bˆnw, kˆne, kˆnw). By definition, this means that kˆne = k¯bˆnene and kˆnw = k¯bˆnwnw .
Let dir ∈ {n,e, s,w} be the direction of the edge from vr−1 to vr in G. The simulator chooses the
garbled circuit encodings such that dir = IndexToDirection(bˆne, bˆnw). Thus, by construction of the
direction keys k¯n, k¯e, k¯s, k¯w, and PRF security, we conclude that the conditional distribution of k¯dir′
given view
(r)
S is computationally indistinguishable from uniform for all directions dir
′ 6= dir. Invoking
semantic security of (Enc,Dec), we conclude that there exists a PPT algorithm S¯2 such that
view
(r)
S
c≈ S¯2
(
1λ, view
(0:r−1)
S , κ¯dir, affine, C
unblind, Cunblind(x¯)
)
. (8)
By definition, vr is the node in direction dir with respect to vr−1, so
κ¯dir = Enc(k¯dir, k¯
(r+1)
src,vdir
) = Enc(k¯dir, k¯
(r+1)
src,vr ). (9)
Since for all v ∈ [n], the simulator chooses k¯(r+1)src,v uniformly and independently (of all other quantities),
we conclude from the characterization in Eq. (8) and (9) that for all nodes v 6= vr, the conditional
distribution of k¯
(r+1)
src,v given view
(0:r)
S is computationally indistinguishable from uniform. The first
condition follows.
• Suppose Cunblind(x¯) = ⊥. Using an argument similar to that made for the previous case, the condi-
tional distribution of the direction keys k¯n, k¯e, k¯s, k¯w given view
(0:r)
S is computationally indistinguish-
able from uniform. By semantic security of (Enc,Dec), we conclude that the adversary’s view can be
entirely simulated independently of k¯
(r+1)
src,v for all v ∈ [n]. Once again, the first condition holds.
To conclude the proof, we note that in the characterization from Eq. (7), all quantities in view
(r)
S are inde-
pendent of k¯dst,v for v 6= t. Thus, if the conditional distribution of k¯dst,v given view(0:r−1)S is computationally
indistinguishable from the uniform distribution, then the corresponding condition continues to hold at the
end of round r.
With this preparation, we now argue inductively that view
(0:R)
real
c≈ view(0:R)S . We begin with the base case.
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Claim A.10. Let s, t ∈ [n] be the indices of the source and destination nodes, respectively, that the client
submits to the OT oracle in the setup phase of the protocol. The following conditions hold at the end of
the setup phase of the protocol:
• The simulator perfectly simulates the view of the A: view(0)real ≡ view(0)S .
• For all nodes v 6= s, the conditional distributions k(1)src,v given view(0)real, and k¯(1)src,v given view(0)S are both
uniform.
• For all nodes v 6= t, the conditional distributions kdst,v given view(0)real and k¯dst,v given view(0)S are both
uniform.
Proof. We consider each claim separately:
• In the real scheme, k(1)src,s, kdst,t are chosen uniformly and independently from {0, 1}`. The same is true
of the keys k¯
(1)
src,s, k¯dst,t in the simulation. Since view
(0)
real = (k
(1)
src,s, kdst,t) and view
(0)
S = (k¯
(1)
src,s, k¯dst,t),
we conclude that view
(0)
real ≡ view(0)S .
• In the real protocol (resp., the simulation), for all v ∈ [n], the encryption key k(1)src,v (resp., k¯(1)src,v)
is chosen uniformly and independently of all other quantities in the protocol. Thus, for v 6= s, the
distribution of k
(1)
src,v is independent of view
(0)
real = (k
(1)
src,s, kdst,t). Similarly, the distribution of k¯
(1)
src,v is
independent of view
(0)
S . The claim follows.
• Similar to the previous statement, for all v ∈ [n], the encryption keys kdst,v and k¯dst,v are chosen
uniformly and independently of all other quantities in the protocol, which proves the claim.
Claim A.11. Fix 0 < r < R. Suppose the following conditions hold in round r:
• The view view(0:r−1)real of the adversary interacting in the real protocol is computationally indistinguish-
able from the view view
(0:r−1)
S of the adversary interacting with the simulator.
• For all nodes v ∈ [n], the conditional distribution of k(r)src,v given view(0:r−1)real is computationally indis-
tinguishable from the uniform distribution over {0, 1}` if and only if the conditional distribution of
k¯
(r)
src,v given view
(0:r−1)
S is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over {0, 1}`.
• For all nodes v ∈ [n], the conditional distribution of kdst,v given view(0:r−1)real is computationally indis-
tinguishable from the uniform distribution over {0, 1}` if and only if the conditional distribution of
k¯dst,v given view
(0:r−1)
S is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over {0, 1}`.
Then, the conditions also hold in round r + 1.
Proof. Let s, t ∈ [n] be the source and destination nodes the client submits to the OT oracle in the setup
phase of the protocol, and let (s = v0, . . . , vR) be the path the simulator receives from the trusted party.
Consider the view of A in the simulation. By Claim A.10, for all v 6= s, the conditional distribution
of the keys k¯
(1)
src,v given view
(0)
S is uniform. Similarly, for all v 6= t, the conditional distribution of the
keys k¯dst,v given view
(0)
S is uniform. By iteratively applying Lemma A.9, we conclude that for all nodes
v 6= vr−1, the conditional distribution of k¯(r)src,v given view(0:r−1)S is computationally indistinguishable from
uniform. Similarly, for all v 6= t, the conditional distribution of k¯dst,t given view(0:r−1)S is computationally
indistinguishable from uniform.
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Invoking the inductive hypothesis, we have that for all nodes v 6= vr−1, the conditional distribution of
k
(r)
src,v given view
(0:r−1)
real is computationally indistinguishable from uniform. Similarly, for all nodes v 6= t,
the conditional distribution of kdst,v given view
(0:r−1)
real is computationally indistinguishable from uniform.
We now show that on round r, (PIRsrc,PIRdst)
c≈ (PIRsrc,PIRdst). The client’s view in the PIR protocol
can be regarded as a (possibly randomized) function of the client’s view in the first r − 1 rounds of
the protocol and the server’s input database D. Since view(0:r−1)real
c≈ view(0:r−1)S , it suffices to argue that
the conditional distribution of (Dsrc,Ddst) given view(0:r−1)real is computationally indistinguishable from the
conditional distribution of (Dsrc,Ddst) given view(0:r−1)S .
For notational convenience, let u = vr−1. We use a hybrid argument. We define the following hybrid
experiments:
• Hybrid H0 is the real game where the server prepares Dsrc and Ddst as described in Figure 3.
• Hybrid H1 is identical to H0, except the server substitutes an encryption of the all-zeroes string under
k
(r)
src,v for all records v 6= u in Dsrc.
• Hybrid H2 is identical to H1, except the server substitutes an encryption of the all-zeroes string under
kdst,v for all records v 6= t in Ddst.
Since for all v 6= u, the conditional distribution of k(r)src,v given view(0:r−1)real is computationally indistinguish-
able from uniform, we can appeal to the semantic security of (Enc,Dec) to conclude that hybrid experiments
H0 and H1 are computationally indistinguishable. Similarly, since for all v 6= t, the conditional distribution
of kdst,v given view
(0:r−1)
real is computationally indistinguishable from uniform, we have that H1 and H2 are
computationally indistinguishable.
We now show that the joint distribution of (Dsrc,Ddst) in H2 is computationally indistinguishable from
the joint distribution of (Dsrc,Ddst) in the simulation. In H2, every record v 6= u in Dsrc is an encryption
of the all-zeroes string under a key k
(r)
src,v that is computationally indistinguishable from uniform given the
adversary’s view of the protocol thus far; the same is true in the simulation. Similarly, every record v 6= t in
Ddst is an encryption of the all-zeroes string under a key kdst,v that looks computationally indistinguishable
from uniform to the adversary. This is the case in the simulation. Let rsrc,u be the u
th record in Dsrc and
let rdst,t be the t
th record in Ddst. Similarly, let r¯src,u be the uth record in Dsrc and let r¯dst,t be the tth record
in Ddst. It suffices now to show that (rsrc,u, rdst,t) is computationally indistinguishable from (r¯src,u, r¯dst,t).
In the real scheme, the record rsrc,u contains the following components:
• Arithmetic circuit encodings L˜affinene,x (A(ne)u ), L˜affinenw,x (A(nw)u ) for the source u.
• Garbled circuit encodings L˜unblinds (u) for the source u.
• Encryptions κn, κe, κs, κw of the source keys for the neighbors of u in the next round of the protocol
under the direction keys kn, ke, ks, kw:
κn = Enc(kn, k
(r+1)
src,vn ), κe = Enc(ke, k
(r+1)
src,ve ), κs = Enc(ks, k
(r+1)
src,vs ), κw = Enc(kw, k
(r+1)
src,vw),
where vn, ve, vs, vw is the neighbor of u in G to the north, east, south, or west, respectively. If u does
not have a neighbor in a given direction dir ∈ {n,e, s,w}, then k(r+1)src,vdir = {0, 1}`.
The record rdst,t contains the following components:
• Arithmetic circuit encodings L˜affinene,y (B(ne)t ), L˜affinenw,y (B(nw)t ) for the destination t.
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• Garbled circuit encodings L˜unblindt (t) for the destination t.
In the real protocol, the arithmetic circuit encodings are constructed independently of the garbled circuit
for the neighbor-computation function. The neighbor keys kdir for dir ∈ {n,e, s,w} and source keys k(r+1)src,vdir
for the subsequent round of the protocol are also generated independently of both the arithmetic circuit
encodings and the garbled circuit. Thus, the joint distribution decomposes into three product distributions
over the arithmetic circuit encodings, the garbled circuit encodings, and the encryptions of the source keys
for the next round. We reason about each distribution separately:
• The simulator constructs the garbled circuit for the neighbor-computation function exactly as in
the real scheme. Thus, the garbled circuit encodings in rsrc,u, r¯src,u and rdst,t, r¯dst,t are identically
distributed.
• The neighbor keys k¯dir for dir ∈ {n,e, s,w} in the simulation are generated exactly as the keys kdir
in the real scheme.
• In the real scheme, the affine encodings L˜affinene,x (A(ne)u ) and L˜affinene,y (B(ne)t ) evaluate to
zne = αne〈A(ne)u , B(ne)t 〉+ βne,
where αne is uniform in F∗p and βne is uniform in Fp. In particular, this means that zne is distributed
uniformly over Fp. This is precisely the same distribution from which the simulator samples z¯ne.
Together with Lemma A.6, we conclude that
Sac(z¯ne) ≡ Sac(zne) ≡ (L˜affinene,x (A(ne)u ), L˜affinene,y (B(ne)t )).
An analogous argument shows that
Sac(z¯nw) ≡ Sac(znw) ≡ (L˜affinenw,x (A(nw)u ), L˜affinenw,y (B(nw)t )),
where znw = αnw〈A(nw)u , B(nw)t 〉+ βnw. We conclude that the arithmetic circuit encodings are iden-
tically distributed in both the real scheme and the simulation.
We conclude that (rsrc,u, rdst,t) ≡ (r¯src,u, r¯dst,t), and correspondingly, (Dsrc,Ddst) c≈ (Dsrc,Ddst). In the real
protocol, the client’s view PIRsrc,PIRdst in the PIR protocols can be expressed as an efficiently-computable
and possibly randomized function f of its view view
(0:r−1)
real in the first r− 1 rounds of the protocol and the
server’s databases Dsrc,Ddst:
(PIRsrc,PIRdst) ≡ f(view(0:r−1)real , rsrc,u, rdst,t).
In the simulation, the simulator synthesizes databases Dsrc,Ddst, and then plays the role of the server in
the PIR protocol. Thus, we have that
(PIRsrc,PIRdst) ≡ f(view(0:r−1)S , r¯src,u, r¯dst,t).
Moreover, we note that the records rsrc,u, rdst,t, r¯src,u, r¯dst,t are constructed independently of variables from
the previous round of the protocol. Thus, using the inductive hypothesis, view
(0:r−1)
real
c≈ view(0:r−1)S , and the
fact that (rsrc,u, rdst,t) ≡ (r¯src,u, r¯dst,t), we conclude that
(PIRsrc,PIRdst) ≡ f(view(0:r−1)real , rsrc,u, rdst,t)
c≈ f(view(0:r−1)S , r¯src,u, r¯dst,t) ≡ (PIRsrc,PIRdst). (10)
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Using this characterization, we can write
view
(0:r)
real =
{
view
(0:r−1)
real , f(view
(0:r−1)
real , rsrc,u, rdst,t), C˜
unblind, L˜unblind
}
, (11)
and similarly,
view
(0:r)
S =
{
view
(0:r−1)
S , f(view
(0:r−1)
S , r¯src,u, r¯dst,t), C¯
unblind, L¯unblind
}
. (12)
From this, we express view
(0:r)
real as an efficiently-computable and possibly randomized function f
′ in the
garbled circuit components and the auxiliary components:
view
(r)
real ≡ f ′
(
L˜unblinds (u), L˜
unblind
t (t), L˜
unblind, C˜unblind, aux
)
, (13)
where aux contains the additional variables view
(r)
real depends on that are independent of the garbled circuit
encodings: view
(0:r−1)
real , the arithmetic circuit encodings, and the encryptions of the source keys for the next
round of the protocol.
Since the simulator prepares the garbled circuit exactly as in the real protocol, from the characterization
of view
(0:r)
S in Eq. (12), we can similarly write
view
(r)
S ≡ f ′
(
L¯unblinds (u), L¯
unblind
t (t), L¯
unblind, C¯unblind, aux
)
, (14)
where aux contains the same auxiliary variables as aux. From Eq. (10), we have in particular that aux
c≈ aux.
By construction, the encodings L˜unblinds (u), L˜
unblind
t (t), L˜
unblind in the real scheme constitutes a com-
plete set of encodings for the garbled circuit C˜unblind. Let x˜ be the associated input to the neighbor-
computation circuit Cunblind. In particular, x˜ = (u, t, zˆne, zˆnw, γne, γnw, δne, δnw, k
0
ne, k
1
ne, k
0
nw, k
1
nw), where
zˆne and zˆnw are the encodings the client OTs for in the protocol execution. Similarly, the encodings
L¯unblinds (u), L¯
unblind
t (t), L¯
unblind constitutes a complete set of encodings for the garbled circuit C¯unblind.
Let x¯ = (u, t, zˆne, zˆnw, γ¯ne, γ¯nw, δ¯ne, δ¯nw, k¯
0
ne, k¯
1
ne, k¯
0
nw, k¯
1
nw) be the associated input to C
unblind in the sim-
ulation. Moreover, by the characterization of the client’s view in Eq. (11) and (12), on each round of the
protocol execution, we can associate two unique sets of affine encodings with the client’s view, one for
each axis. Let zne and znw denote the values to which these two sets of affine encodings evaluate. In the
real execution, we thus have zne = αne〈A(ne)u , B(ne)t 〉 + βne and znw = αnw〈A(nw)u , B(nw)t 〉 + βnw. In the
simulation, we have zne = z¯ne and znw = z¯nw. We now consider three cases:
• Suppose that the client OTs for the encodings of inputs consistent with the outputs of the arithmetic
circuit. In other words, zˆne = zne and zˆnw = znw. By definition, if u = t, then C
unblind(x˜) = ⊥.
Otherwise, by correctness of the affine encodings, Cunblind(x˜) = (bˆne, bˆnw, k
bˆne
ne , k
bˆnw
nw ), where dir =
IndexToDirection(bˆne, bˆnw) is the direction of travel from u to t, as determined by the next-hop routing
matrices A(ne), B(ne), A(nw), B(nw). In particular, dir is the direction of the edge from u = vr−1 to
vr. In the simulation, when zˆne = z¯ne and zˆnw = z¯nw, the simulator chooses unblinding factors
γ¯ne, γ¯nw, δ¯ne, δ¯nw such that C
unblind(x¯) = Cunblind(x˜). Now, invoking the input-privacy of the garbling
scheme (Definition A.4), we conclude that{
L˜unblinds (u), L˜
unblind
t (t), L˜
unblind, C˜unblind
}
c≈ SYao(1λ, Cunblind, Cunblind(x¯))
c≈
{
L¯unblinds (u), L¯
unblind
t (t), L¯
unblind, C¯unblind
}
.
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Since the garbled circuit components of view
(r)
real are computationally indistinguishable from view
(r)
S ,
we conclude that view
(r)
real
c≈ view(r)S .
To see the second condition of Claim A.11 holds, we appeal to input privacy of the garbling scheme
to argue that the conditional distribution of the keys k1−bˆnene and k1−bˆnwnw is computationally indistin-
guishable from uniform given view
(0:r)
real . As in the proof of Lemma A.9, the conditional distribution
of k′dir for all directions dir
′ 6= dir ∈ {n,e, s,w} is computationally indistinguishable from uniform
given view
(0:r)
real . Finally, invoking semantic security of (Enc,Dec), we conclude that for all v 6= vr, the
conditional distribution of k
(r+1)
src,v is computationally indistinguishable from uniform. As shown in the
proof of Lemma A.9, this is precisely the case in the simulation.
The third condition of Claim A.11 holds since the components in the client’s view in round r of
the real scheme (Eq. 11) are independent of the destination keys kdst,v for all v 6= t. Since the
conditional distribution of kdst,v for v 6= t given view(0:r−1)real is computationally indistinguishable from
uniform, the conditional distribution remains uniform conditioned on view
(0:r)
real . This precisely matches
the distribution in the simulation (Lemma A.9).
• Suppose that u = t. Then, Cunblind(x˜) = ⊥ = Cunblind(x¯). As in the previous case, input privacy of
the garbling scheme yields view
(r)
real
c≈ view(r)S .
It is not difficult to see that the second condition of Claim A.11 holds. Since Cunblind(x˜) = ⊥,
the conditional distribution of the keys k0ne, k
1
ne, k
0
nw, k
1
nw is computationally indistinguishable from
uniform given view
(0:r)
real . By semantic security of (Enc,Dec), we conclude that the conditional distri-
bution of k
(r+1)
src,v given view
(0:r)
real is computationally indistinguishable from uniform for all v ∈ [n]. By
the case analysis in the proof of Lemma A.9, this is also the case in the simulation.
The third condition follows as in the previous case.
• Suppose that u 6= t and moreover, the client OTs for encodings of inputs that are inconsistent with
the outputs of the arithmetic circuit. We consider two possibilities.
– Suppose that exactly one of zˆne 6= zne and zˆnw 6= znw hold. Without loss of generality, suppose
that zˆne 6= zne. In the real scheme, this means that zˆne 6= αne〈A(ne)u , B(ne)t 〉 + βne. Next, since
γne = α
−1
ne and δne = α
−1
ne βne, where αne is uniform in F∗p and βne is uniform in Fp. Thus,
γne and δne are also distributed uniformly over F∗p and Fp, respectively. Since the family of
functions
{
hγ,δ(z) = γz + δ (mod p) | γ ∈ F∗p, δ ∈ Fp
}
is pairwise independent, it follows that
for any distinct zne, z
?
ne ∈ Fp, and all a, b ∈ Fp,
Pr [hγne,δne(zne) = a ∧ hγne,δne(z?ne) = b] =
1
p2
,
where the probability is taken over the randomness in γne and δne. The client’s choice of zˆne and
zˆnw depends only on its view view
(0:r−1)
real of the protocol execution in the previous rounds of the
protocol, as well as its view PIRsrc and PIRdst in the PIR protocol. The quantities γne and δne
are sampled independently of view
(0:r−1)
real . By the above characterization of PIRsrc and PIRdst,
the joint distribution of (PIRsrc,PIRdst) is entirely simulatable given only zne and variables that
are independent of γne and δne (by invoking the simulator for the affine encodings). Thus, by
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pairwise independence, we conclude that
Pr [hγne,δne(zˆne) ∈ [−2τ , 2τ ]] =
2τ+1
p
= ε.
If zˆne 6= zne, then with probability 1− ε, Cunblind(x˜) = ⊥. With probabilty ε, Cunblind(x˜) 6= ⊥,
but this precisely corresponds to the first abort condition in experiment Hyb1. Thus, in Hyb1,
with probability 1− ε, Cunblind(x˜) = ⊥ and with probability ε, the protocol execution aborts.
In the simulation, the simulator chooses the unblinding factors γ¯ne, γ¯nw, δ¯ne, δ¯nw, such that
Cunblind(x¯) = ⊥ with probability 1− ε. With probability ε, the simulator aborts. We conclude
by input privacy of the garbling scheme that the simulation is correct. The analysis for the case
where zˆnw 6= znw, but zˆne = zne is entirely analogous.
– Suppose that both zˆne 6= zne and zˆnw 6= znw. By the same analysis as in the first case, we have
that
Pr [hγne,δne(zˆne) ∈ [−2τ , 2τ ]] = ε = Pr [hγnw,δnw(zˆnw) ∈ [−2τ , 2τ ]] .
Since the two events are independent, Cunblind(x˜) 6= ⊥ with probability ε2, and the experiment
aborts in Hyb1. With probability 1 − ε2, Cunblind(x˜) = ⊥. In the simulation, the simulator
chooses the unblinding factors such that Cunblind(x¯) = ⊥ with probability 1 − ε2, and aborts
with probability ε2. Correctness of the simulation follows by input privacy of the garbling
scheme.
Since Cunblind(x˜) is either equal to ⊥ or the experiment aborts, the proof of the second and third
statements of Claim A.11 follows exactly as in the previous case.
Combining Claim A.10 and Claim A.11, we conclude by induction on r that view
(0:R)
real
c≈ view(0:R)S . Thus,
the view of the protocol execution simulated by S for A is computationally indistinguishable from the view
of A interacting with the server in Hyb1. Correctness of the simulation follows.
Proof of Claim A.7. To conclude the proof of Theorem 4.5, we show Claim A.7, or equivalently, that
no efficient adversary is able to distinguish Hyb0 from Hyb1 except with advantage negl(λ) + R · 2−µ. Let
A be a distinguisher between Hyb0 and Hyb1 with distinguishing advantage Adv:
Adv = |Pr [Hyb0(λ, pi,A, E)]− Pr [Hyb1(λ, pi,A, E)]| .
By construction, Hyb0 and Hyb1 are identical experiments, except experiment Hyb1 terminates if the abort
event in Figure 5 occurs. Thus, it must be the case that A is able to cause the bad event to occur with
probability Adv in the real experiment. But by Claim A.8, the real protocol execution experiment with
the abort event is computationally indistinguishable from the ideal-world execution with the simulator S
described in the proof of Claim A.8. Thus, if A is able to trigger the abort event in the real protocol
execution with probability Adv, it is able to trigger the abort event when interacting with the simulator S
with probability that is negligibly close to Adv. It suffices now to bound the probability that the simulator
S aborts the protocol execution. On each round r, the simulator S aborts with probability at most
ε = 2τ+1/p ≤ 2−µ since p > 2µ+τ+1 (irrespective of the computational power of the adversary). By a union
bound over the total number of rounds R, we conclude that S aborts with probability at most R · 2−µ in
the protocol execution. Thus, the probability that A can trigger the abort event in the real protocol must
be negligibly close to R · 2−µ. We conclude that Adv ≤ negl(λ) +R · 2−µ, which proves the claim.
Claims A.7 and A.8 show that no no efficient environment can distinguish the real-world execution
(Hyb0) from the ideal-world execution (Hyb2), except with advantage negligibly close to R ·2µ. This proves
Theorem 4.5.
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